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**Karpov Interviewed on INF, START, SDI,
European Issues**

52001061z Moscow NEW TIMES in English
No 10, Mar 88 pp 5-7

[NEW TIMES correspondent Konstantin Isakov talks to Victor Karpov, chief of the Arms Limitation and Disarmament Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.]

[Text] NEW TIMES: While the INF treaty is still pending ratification by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the U.S. Congress, with the world public looking on in eager anticipation, the Soviet Union has already started to pull out its medium-range missiles from the GDR and Czechoslovakia. The new thinking has once again made itself felt in world politics. But is there a limit to good will?

Victor Karpov: Of course there is, and it is determined by the interests of the security of our country and that of our allies. We cannot go beyond this limit. But the Soviet Union has never refused to work actively within it.

The withdrawal of the SS-12 missiles from the territories of the GDR and Czechoslovakia, along with launching installations and auxiliary equipment, which began on 25 February and will end in March, shows that the Soviet Union is remaining true to its course. This long-awaited withdrawal must become another brick in the edifice of our common European home. Readiness to promote its construction does not depend on whether at a given moment our partners are taking similar action. The situation is developing in such a way as to ensure that the INF treaty, judging by everything, will be ratified. And the Soviet Government's decision proves that the USSR is prepared to implement it.

N.T.: A highlight in world events was U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz's first visit to Moscow in late February since the signing of the INF treaty, and the first one this year, in preparation for a Moscow summit. What would you say about the results of the talks?

V.K.: I would say the main feature of the talks was that they were a logical extension of the Washington meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, a follow-up of the line set out in the joint statement on its results. It is not only a question of preparing the agreements that could be described as a 50 percent cut in strategic offensive weapons. There is a broader meaning: How can the USSR and the United States, having started to reduce and eliminate nuclear arms, ensure strategic stability in relations between the two countries, and make this process irreversible?

For this it is essential that the 1972 ABM treaty, around which the entire process of limiting and cutting back the strategic arms of the two countries revolves, should remain in force in an unchanged form. Then, together with the Americans, we have to start thinking: what next? What should be the next step towards ensuring the

continuation of the process of cooperation between the USSR and the United States in reducing the nuclear threat, abolishing chemical weapons and cutting back conventional arms? We saw the Secretary of State's visit as the touchstone of the American administration's intentions.

Before the visit, we were put on our guard by the behavior of the American delegation in Geneva. It was going back on many of the agreements reached in Washington. The impression was that the Americans had lost interest in the constructive preparation of the text of a SOA treaty and other documents needed for signing in Moscow. But the Secretary of State arrived in a somewhat different mood, one which I would describe as businesslike, as can be judged from the results of his talks with Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze.

On the whole his visit was useful. We discussed a wide range of regional and humanitarian problems. What is particularly important from the point of view of the future of our relations, in my opinion, is the Secretary of State's readiness to give full and concise legal form to the agreements reached in Washington—to observe the ABM treaty as it was signed in 1972 for an agreed term. Up till then the American delegation in Geneva had failed to take a constructive stand on this issue. The Moscow talks showed that our partners evidently are prepared in future to work in Geneva in a more businesslike spirit.

N.T.: How would you explain the difference in the stand taken by Shultz and by the American delegation in Geneva? Is there anything behind that?

V.K.: Of course, one could start surmising as to what lies behind the unconstructive stand taken by the American representatives in Geneva. But I think the key is not in the American delegation itself, but in the overall situation in the United States in a presidential election year. It is characterized by lack of clarity about the future, sometimes a deliberate ambiguity about the stand taken by the different political forces. It is also important for the U.S. administration, which links its hopes of carrying on its policy with the election of a Republican President, to know what is likely to help it and what is not. Apparently, since the Washington summit, serious changes have taken place in the Republican political kitchen which determines the further policy of the Republican Party. And that presumably led to Shultz receiving certain powers—for all we can hopefully tell. President Reagan's WASHINGTON POST interview of 26 February was at variance with what the Secretary of State had said. The President voiced his doubts whether there would be enough time to get the Strategic Offensive Arms treaty ready for signing during his Moscow visit, but did not strike this item off the agenda.

The INF treaty signed in Washington last 8 December is receiving increasing support in the United States. That is evident from the public opinion polls and the mood of

the Senate. The small group of Senators that oppose it seems to be in isolation. Even some of the legislators who were initially sceptical or hostile to the treaty are now changing their attitude under pressure from the electorate.

N.T.: Can one now hope for changes in the American position at the Geneva talks?

V.K.: I think it would be premature to make any forecasts. The main criteria for us is whether any real progress is made within the next month, i.e., before the next meeting between the Soviet Foreign Minister and the American Secretary of State in Washington, whether or not we advance in the preparation of the draft agreements on SOA. If we lose this month, we can lose the chance of signing them.

N.T.: The question of drafting a treaty on a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms [SOA] was touched on in the talks between General Secretary Gorbachev and Secretary of State Shultz. The view was expressed that such a treaty required much more complex verification procedures than those for the INF. Could you explain that?

V.K.: Procedures for the verification of the liquidation of those armaments that are to be cut represent an objective difficulty as they cover much more ground than medium- and shorter-range missiles. Better inspection will be required. But given political will of the two sides, these questions can be resolved in keeping with each side's interests and to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty itself.

I should like to point out that the Gorbachev-Shultz talks touched on a whole series of questions of principled significance from the point of view of prospects of stability in Soviet-American relations. It is essential to do away with the atmosphere of mutual suspicion and mistrust which, it must be admitted, existed between us until recently. That can only be done through a combination of measures that would lead to reducing military confrontation and promoting greater trust and openness in relations between our two countries.

N.T.: The ratification debates on the INF treaty in the USSR and U.S.A. legislative bodies have aroused wide international discussion on the issue of European defence and possible changes in NATO strategy. In the West the idea of "compensation" is seen as the sole alternative, although there is not a word about it in the Washington agreements. And the Moscow talks showed that other possible solutions exist. So how should one view the idea of "compensation"? Is it a mere declaration, albeit a dangerous one, or is it taking practical shape?

V.K.: I think the statements coming from the various NATO countries should be taken seriously. Behind them lie trends, often contradictory, but which could complicate the situation, particularly in Europe. The idea of "compensation" is basically wrong. But to say that the West is unanimous in its views and regards it as the sole alternative would be a mistake. We know of deep-lying differences in the assessment of the INF treaty in West European government circles. The elimination of two classes of nuclear weapon in Europe is an unprecedented event on our continent. Consequently there can be no precedent for the reaction of European governments. The problems of getting down to disarmament in practice have proved anything but easy for many West European politicians. But does that mean that an arms race is inevitable? Probably not. There are increasing signs that the plans for rearmament and "compensation" are not getting substantial support, particularly in the GDR, where the wish is being expressed not to be content with what had been achieved, but to go further.

In the ruling quarters of Federal Germany we are witnessing a determination to move ahead with the reduction and elimination of shorter-range nuclear weapons. The West German delegation at the Geneva Disarmament Conference is taking an active part in drafting a convention on the banning and abolition of chemical weapons. The question has been raised of carrying out the agreement reached earlier to remove American chemical weapons from West German soil. Yet only recently it would have been hard to imagine Bonn making such a move.

Other trends, too, are noticeable. France, for example, is especially concerned about the fate of its own nuclear arsenal. Differences are to be observed among the political forces at the Vienna talks, where 23 NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries are drawing up a mandate for talks on a reduction in conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

N.T.: Could you give us some idea of what to expect at the talks in Vienna in the future?

V.K.: For a start, as the Soviet Union is suggesting, the conference could consider the elimination of all imbalances in conventional armaments and armed forces and then to bring them down to a level that would rule out any possibility of offensive operations. Such a course of events, taken in conjunction with the abolition of shorter-range nuclear weapons, would change the situation on the continent, making it entirely different from what we have today. That frightens some people.

A number of issues have already been agreed on at the Vienna consultations. For instance, the aim of the talks has been defined. But there remain questions on the differences that still have to be ironed out. The main one is on the subject covered by the talks. As military technology in the field of conventional armaments advances, things have reached a stage where the greater

part of the arsenals of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries consists of dual-purpose weapons (some less so, others more). Take artillery. Starting from 152-mm guns, both conventional and nuclear shells can be used. The tactical air force can also carry both types. And it looks as if it will soon be possible to equip tanks with nuclear artillery. So the classic concept of conventional weapons no longer holds. The Warsaw Treaty countries want all armaments that could use both conventional and nuclear shells to be covered by the talks. The official NATO stand (although differences in individual views exist) is that no mention of nuclear weapons should be made in the mandate. The French are particularly active on this issue. They regard all their nuclear weapons as strategic or pre-strategic rather than shorter-range. Therefore, in their view, they should not be a subject of negotiations. In my opinion, other NATO representatives are using the French position as a pretext for delaying the drafting of a mandate.

The task now is to find a reasonable compromise between extreme points of view. That is what the Warsaw Treaty countries are trying to do. We have agreed that the nuclear component, i.e., the shells and nuclear bombs, should at this stage be left out of the mandate now being prepared. It would authorize the participants in the talks to reduce only the carriers. As for the nuclear components, they could be the subject of separate talks. In principle, the West agrees to such an approach. All that is now needed is a mutually-acceptable formula.

There are also problems pertaining to the zone to which reductions would apply. For instance, would island territories be included or, say, the Asian part of Turkey? We also have to establish the connection with Stockholm-2, that is, the follow-up of the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, with the talks of the 23 NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries.

N.T.: What do you think of the talks, likewise in Vienna, that have been under way for almost 15 years on a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe? Are they still going on?

V.K.: They are still alive, and it would be wrong to discount them. The questions they are discussing are of considerable significance for Central Europe, where the confrontation of the blocs is felt most. Of course the absence of progress and prospects for agreement do warrant concern, in view of the preparation of new talks embracing all of Europe. But we hope that the drafting of a mandate for European talks will touch on the centre of the continent as well. So it seems that some way of combining the two will be found.

N.T.: The magazine receives a great many letters from both Soviet and foreign readers who are worried that the Soviet Union, now busy cutting back on nuclear missiles, might have lost its vigilance with regard to SDI. What would you say to them?

V.K.: The question of SDI is really a question of what the United States wants from the point of view of strategic stability in our relations, whether it wants a continuation of the arms race or a lower level of nuclear confrontation; whether it wants the problems connected with surprise attacks, war as a result of technical mishaps or miscalculations removed from the agenda. The SDI programme is an index of how seriously the United States takes the Soviet Union.

And the American administration has taken an ambiguous stand. On the one hand, Washington wants agreement on a 50 percent cut in strategic offensive arms and understands that this cannot be achieved without abiding by the ABM treaty. This understanding was reflected in the Washington agreements and during Mr Shultz's visit to Moscow. But on the other hand, the American President, who put forward the idea of SDI back in 1983, has painted himself into a corner on the issue. So some tactical manoeuvring is going to be necessary, for it is recognized that unless the implementation of SDI is suspended for a sufficiently long time, there will be neither strategic offensive arms reduction nor stability in our relations. The "star wars" programme is certainly a major element in the strategic equation of Soviet-American relations. There is another element as well—the possible countermeasures we may take to SDI. The response could be asymmetrical, making the programme worthless from the military point of view. But we should not like to get involved in a wasteful SDI-anti-SDI race. It would be much more sensible and promising to pursue the course of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons, excluding them altogether from the strategic equation.

In other words, we are not becoming less vigilant about SDI. But we do believe that compliance with the ABM treaty will make it possible to put through intermediary measures that will bring about greater stability. And when a 50 percent cut is made in strategic offensive weapons, when the new situation has emerged, then one can better assess the prospects of strategic relations between the USSR and the United States. We are convinced that the key to a system of relations capable of ensuring peace and cooperation between our two countries, to an all-embracing system of peace and security, lies in carrying on the nuclear disarmament process, eliminating other weapons of mass destruction, reducing troops and armaments—rather than adding a new dimension to the arms race. This is the road to follow till the end of the century—and further on.

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Volkogonov on Changing Role of Military
18120068 Moscow ASIA AND AFRICA TODAY in
English No 1, Jan 88 pp 20-25

[Article contains reprint of interview with Col Gen Dmitriy Antonovich Volkogonov, deputy chief of Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, which appeared in ARGUMENTY I FACTY: "The Army of a New World"]

[Excerpts] In May 1987, the Soviet Union and a number of socialist countries—members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation adopted a joint statement which expounded the military doctrine of this defensive alliance.

This fundamental document among other things states:

"The military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty, just as of each of its member-countries, is subordinated to the task of preventing war, both nuclear and conventional. Due to the very nature of the socialist system, these states have never linked and do not link their future with the military solution of international problems. They call for a solution of all disputed international problems peacefully, by political means.

"The military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty member-states is strictly defensive. It is based on the principle that, under the present circumstances, the use of military means for the resolution of any disputed question is impermissible.

"The Warsaw Treaty member-states will never, under any circumstances, start hostilities against any country or an alliance of countries, unless they become the target of a military attack themselves.

"They will never be the first to use nuclear weapons.

"They have no territorial claims to any state either in Europe or outside it.

"They do not view any state, any people as their enemy.

"While favouring the implementation of disarmament measures, the Warsaw Treaty member-states are compelled to maintain their armed forces in a composition and at a level that would enable them to repulse any attack from outside against any Treaty member-state.

"The combat readiness of the armed forces of the allied states is maintained at a sufficient level so as not to be caught unawares. In the event of an attack, they will give a devastating rebuff to the aggressor."

The Soviet Armed Forces, as do their allies, confirm these words by deeds.

We believe the interview entitled "The Law of the Nuclear Age" which we reprinted from the Soviet publication ARGUMENTY I FACTY (ARGUMENTS AND FACTS) with substantial abridgements will be of interest to our readers. The interview was given by the deputy head of the Chief Political Department of the Soviet Army and Navy, Dr Sc (Philos), Professor, Colonel-General Dmitri Volkogonov who is the author of many books on military theory.

[Question] Comrade General, in your opinion, how has the relationship between war and politics changed in the light of the new thinking? What is the effect of the new thinking on theory and practice?

[Answer] Let me quote from an article which Lenin wrote in Geneva in 1915 "...war is simply the continuation of politics by other [i.e. violent] means". Such is the formula of Clausewitz, one of the greatest writers on the history of war, whose thinking was stimulated by Hegel. And it was always the standpoint of Marx and Engels, who regarded any war as the continuation of politics...." Why am I using this quotation which taught many people to understand, as Lenin put it, "the secrets of the origins of war"? Because, in our view, this formula should not be called absurd (the principle of historicism!). It is not that there is little credit to be earned from overthrowing the long vanished authorities. The point is that the relationship between war and politics is more profound in the nuclear age than it may seem at first glance.

Let me explain what I mean. Nuclear weapons have overgrown the purposes for which they were created. The fundamentally new level of military technology has added a new dimension to war itself. In fact, war (of course, nuclear war) has reached a limit, a frontier, a certain threshold. From this perspective, Clausewitz is hopelessly outdated. Speaking of the functional aspect of the phenomenon of war, it has ceased to be sensible, rational means of politics. Otherwise, as Mikhail Gorbachev said addressing the Moscow Peace Forum on February 16, 1987, "the authors of this policy will themselves burn in a nuclear war." I think that this is crucial to present-day definition of the relationship between war and politics.

On the other hand, if we define the genesis and essence of unthinkable (though possible) nuclear war, then it can only help pursue a mad, criminal and adventuristic policy which leads to non-existence. As for the argument "what kind of a continuation of politics is it, if all will perish in such a war?", this is already the result of the criminal policy. Therefore, war can be a monstrous continuation of a criminal policy. Our work for peace implies that we should tirelessly expose those who generate such a policy.

[Question] Many readers followed your polemics with a well-known Soviet writer concerning the ways of mankind's survival. What is the principal difference in your approaches?

[Answer] I must say at the outset: I respect the writer for a frank exposition of his views, though I differ with him in principle. His ideas and utterances on the problem of survival boil down to the following: "Survival at any price." He thinks that there is no need for a deterring capability to make a retaliatory strike. It is a "shame" to have an atomic bomb. The military are good only in the

cloak of pacifists. Education should be "antiwar-patriotic," etc. According to his logic, we should not stop even at unilateral disarmament.

I believe the writer has no reason to suppose that his opponents estimate the real danger less competently. One should not give in to intellectual confusion. I remember my mixed and complex feelings at first visiting a combat missile installation which carried charges of fantastic power. These incredible means of destruction were created by human genius.... Was there ever anything more paradoxical in human history? But the writer himself says that emotions are a bad counsel in the matter. We cannot be blamed for possessing nuclear weapons. Had the US accepted, in 1946, the Soviet proposal to ban forever the "nuclear stick" (to quote President Harry Truman), the situation would have been different today. It is those who do not want to eliminate nuclear arsenals on equitable terms that should be "ashamed." We had to develop nuclear weapons to offset the extremely dangerous challenge from the USA. How can one disregard this?

As for a realistic approach to the survival of civilisation, it was well grounded at the 27th CPSU Congress and in a number of statements by Soviet leaders. It is essential to survive without giving up one's ideals, principles and spiritual values. And our state, the Party, believe this is possible. Our class approach to peace tallies with the universal human approach, rather than contradicts it. An adequate way to survival lies through compromises, negotiations and mutual concessions. But only provided these are based on equal security. As long as there is no political mechanism for preventing nuclear war (we all believe that sooner or later it will be created!) we have to rely on a military mechanism. The latter can work only if there is a parity of strategic forces. Today, this is the chief material guarantee of security of this country and that of our allies. I would even say that the dialectic relationship between the strategic balance and security is now one of the laws of preserving peace in our nuclear age.

[Question] A document on the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty member-states has been adopted. What are the main features of this doctrine?

[Answer] There is virtually no state which does not have its own concept of how to conduct a possible war. That has been always so and everywhere.

The political aspect of our doctrine has always been formulated by the Party and has reflected the defensive character of Soviet aspirations. The military and technological aspect is reflected in the tenets of Soviet military science, military art, in combat manuals of the Army and the Navy. I could name several dozen books on the Soviet Armed Forces, which analyse different aspects of the Soviet military doctrine. True, there are few works dealing with the doctrine as a whole. An increased attention to the military doctrine was generated by the

fact that it is discussed at some length in the new edition of the CPSU Programme which emphasises that it is "purely defensive in nature" and is aimed at "ensuring protection against an outside attack."

The new thinking, the desire to shift further the emphasis from military to political means of averting any manifestations of the causes of war have generated the need for the fraternal countries to adopt a common document which would express their conception on the issue. The military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty member-states is geared, as the document puts it, to the "task of preventing war, both nuclear and conventional." It is basically an anti-war doctrine. This is the principal feature of the military concept. Among others, I would like to mention the dialectical relationship between the peace policy of socialist states and their readiness and determination to defend their social gains.

[Question] Reorganisation is underway in the USSR. It is accompanied by a policy of openness. We know less about the military organisation than other spheres because of its specific character. Are there problems in the Army which are difficult to resolve but which, nevertheless, are not presented to the public eye?

[Answer] You rightly noted that the Armed Forces are a specific organisation. There are data of operational, technical, statistical and other nature that, under the law, are not subject to wide distribution. Such are the interests of defence. Though I should point out that after the Congress many classified materials became available to the public. Here is but one example. The fourth edition of the booklet *Whence the Threat to Peace* by Voenizdat Publishers and Novosti Press Agency, contains many data on the Soviet Army's strategic armaments (the number of land-, sea- and air-based launchers, the number of nuclear charges, etc.).

The current renovation in the Army and the Navy is not a smooth process. There are difficult problems that are being tackled very slowly. We felt this with particular acuteness after the violation of the Soviet air space by the West German pilot. The plane was spotted when it was only approaching the Soviet border and, technically, it was quite easy to cut the flight short. But because of carelessness, irresponsibility and indecision on the part of some officers at all levels, everything happened as it did. On May 30, 1987, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo issued a strong-worded statement deploring the fact which highlighted a number of shortcomings in Army and Navy organisation. I must say that the heads of the Ministry of Defense and the Chief Political Department of the Soviet Army and Navy are working hard to deal with the accumulated serious defects.

In the process of reorganisation, commanding officers, political bodies, Party and Komsomol locals are seeking to attain their main objective—to prepare officers and men to be up to the tasks facing the Armed Forces. Special emphasis is laid on personal responsibility for

keeping up combat readiness at every unit and ship, and for any particular mission. They are also encouraging social and moral activity of every soldier, sailor, sergeant, petty officer, warrant officer, and officer. The most difficult thing is to reorganise oneself. Make a small experiment. Try—when you are alone—to name aloud your negative qualities, base traits, and faults.... You will see that it is not easy to confess something frankly. But without this you cannot bring your inner world in line with the spirit of our time.

Party organizations have noticeably enhanced their role in tackling personnel issue, in promoting combat training, education.... But there are still problems which are being solved with difficulty. The important thing is full observance of strict military discipline in units and on board ships. We would like young men to acquire, in the family, at school, at the point of production, firm orientation toward genuine collectivism and an acute sense of human dignity, honour and nobility.

[Question] The military-patriotic education of youth is an important task. What problems, in your opinion, still await solution in this sphere?

[Answer] The main task is improving military-patriotic education is to prepare the youth for military service. Time is irreversible. One generation follows another. But the Army has always been a kind of "university for men" giving training to millions of people. Ask those who served in the Army: What years in their life are most memorable? On numerous occasions I saw that the years of military service ranked first.

But let us be frank: there are still a lot of problems here. For example, some young men under-estimate the reality of the war threat, believing it to be ephemeral, kind of habitual. They are influenced by abstract pacifist speculations, by the condemnation of war as such, no matter whence the source of the threat. Unfortunately, the "anti-war patriotic education," which is promoted by some people, is beginning to have its effect. Many youngsters have a poor knowledge of the history of war. The number of young men who want to become career officers is low in some regions of the country, as is evidenced by the student composition at military schools. Many young men are unprepared for the hardships of the service. They are physically weak and there are some who know Russian badly—the main means of communication between nationalities. There are young men who used to drink hard liquor or even used drug before the service, or were at odds with the law. As you see, problems do exist. They can be solved through an overall improvement in education of the younger generation.

In June 1986, the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a resolution on improving the pre-draft training of young men. Positive shifts are in evidence, but reorganisation is also needed here. Much has been and can be done here by DOSAAF

(Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, the Air Force and the Navy) which trains pre-draftees in the many military specialties. Much can be done by veterans of the Second World War and the young men who performed their internationalist duty in Afghanistan. In meeting them, I came to the conclusion that the majority of them became socially mature two or three years earlier than their peers. They are more sensitive to good, evil, justice. As a rule, one can always rely on these young men.

[Question] You are a career officer, but you wrote many books, booklets and newspaper articles. How do you manage to combine your career with scientific and literary work? What are you working on now?

[Answer] My colleagues and I have to work twelve hours a day on the average. Unfortunately, we have not yet learned to organise our schedule better. I write during leaves, on weekends (if I get any), sometimes at night. There is no other time. Scientific work seriously helps, rather than impedes, my main job, becomes its organic element. This year the Politizdat Publishers will issue by book *The Weapon of Truth*. From time to time I work on another book, *The Army in the Nuclear Age*. Though I do not know what publishing house will be interested in the manuscript. Times are such that we have to do everything on time, the present is never completed, and the future is always begun. Often, it is closer than some people think.

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First Deputy Chief of Staff on 'New Thinking,' Military Doctrine

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No 8, Feb 88 pp 12-13

[NEW TIMES interviews Colonel General Vladimir Lobov, first deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff]

[Text] [Question] The Red Army was founded 70 years ago. The victory in the Great Patriotic War and the routing of fascism is a major landmark in its history. But some people in the West seem to forget this, turning the Red Army into a bogeyman. Are there any grounds for their fear?

[Answer] The myth about the aggressiveness of the Red Army is as old as the Red Army itself. When 14 states moved their troops from all sides against Soviet Russia, Western propaganda began to disseminate the lie about an "invasion by the Bolshevik hordes." Since then it has constantly intimidated people with the "red threat." The more vigorous the fight for peace and the more peace initiatives the Soviet Union advances, the more subtle are the calumnies about the aggressiveness of the Soviet Army.

Now that the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles is a real possibility, the opponents of disarmament have again turned to the subject of USSR's "superiority" in conventional weapons, tanks in particular. Moreover, our tanks are said to have fantastic performance, for instance, the ability to reach the English Channel in a matter of hours. According to Western news reports, Britain has started forming anti-tank brigades to repel a Soviet tank attack in Europe.

The "Soviet threat" is a fabrication of the military-industrial complex of the West. It is actively used to influence the population and exert pressure on governments and public opinion with the aim of maintaining arms production as a source of profits.

The real, and very dangerous, threat to peace comes from the military-industrial complex, which has a very damaging effect on the entire system of international relations.

[Question] Defence of their country and the routing of aggression have traditionally been the chief tasks of the armed forces. In our time there can be no winner in a war. How is this concept treated by the Soviet Army? Have the goals and tasks of the army changed in a society which sees the prevention of war as its most important objective?

[Answer] The first decree of the Soviet Government was the Decree on Peace. The defence of our country has traditionally been considered the paramount task of the state and its Armed Forces.

The Programme of the CPSU and the documents of the 27th Party Congress point out that there will be no winners or losers in a global armed conflict. The task of averting war becomes particularly imperative in such circumstances. This makes it essential to raise the level of discipline and responsibility among servicemen, who must maintain a high degree of vigilance and improve their combat skill and preparedness. Defence of our country is a multifaceted concept. Who will gain the upper hand—the forces of peace or the forces of war? This depends on the contribution the Soviet Army makes to the cause of preventing war.

So, there can be winners, though not in nuclear war but in the struggle to avert it. The Soviet Armed Forces today defend both their own homeland and world peace.

[Question] There are two military blocs in Europe—the Organization of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO. Both blocs claim that their doctrines have a defensive character. But military confrontation is not over. In what way can the two blocs prove the sincerity of their intentions?

[Answer] Let me say first of all that the doctrinal principles of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO are not the same, and that this explains the continued military confrontation. The chief objective of the Warsaw

Treaty's military doctrine is prevention of war, while NATO's military doctrine contains aggressive provisions aimed at destroying socialism as a social and political system.

"Socialism resolutely rejects war as a means of settling political and economic contradictions and ideological disputes between states," the 27th Congress of the CPSU pointed out. This determines the Soviet Union's fundamental policy of strengthening international security and peace by carrying out a complex of measures and programmes for broader international cooperation in the field of disarmament.

NATO regards war and combat operations not as an inadmissible form of interstate relations, but as a practical instrument for settling disputes and problems in its favour. This explains why NATO recognizes the U.S. concept of conflicts of high, medium and low intensity. To a certain extent, this concept found expression in the armed conflict unleashed by Britain against Argentina over the Falkland Islands in 1982, in the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983, the U.S. air attack on Libya, the armed intervention of France in the affairs of Chad, and other actions.

[Question] Do you see any possibility of cooperation with NATO in building a complex of confidence-building measures?

[Answer] Mikhail Gorbachev pointed to the possibility of cooperation with NATO in the provision of confidence-building measures: "We should lay our cards on the table, exchange all the data, evaluate them, clarify the asymmetry in armaments and troops, and start tackling the problems. Such is our approach."

The members of both alliances have declared that in their international relations they strictly observe the principles laid down in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act. Under the Stockholm agreements, they already practise such confidence-building measures as notification of military exercises and the invitation of observers to monitor them.

The Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty states have called on NATO countries to reduce the arms and troop concentration on their contact line to a minimum agreed level, remove the most dangerous offensive weapons from this zone, set up a nuclear-free corridor along the contact line of the two blocs, and create in Europe zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons and with a lower concentration of armaments, and zones of enhanced confidence. All this is possible to achieve by mutual agreement and effort.

[Question] Democratization is perhaps the most important process now taking place in our country. It has spread to the army too. But what does democratization mean in the army?

[Answer] All the processes taking place in socialist society find their reflection in the Armed Forces as well. Perestroika in the army means a cardinal readjustment of mechanisms which have inhibited progress, the elimination of stagnant phenomena, and constructive, productive activity to improve the state of affairs in every field.

The whole complex of social relations is to be found in the army, which fully reflects the democratic character of our social system. Far from contradicting the service's regulations, democratism emphasizes the socialist nature of our Armed Forces. Of course, the process of democratization in the army and navy has its specific features, because one-man command, discipline and the execution of orders have to be combined with broad participation by Party and Young Communist League branches and all personnel in all affairs of military units.

The basic idea of democratization is that servicemen should be trusted more and display greater initiative and independence in their activity. The responsibility for the job entrusted to servicemen is being raised too. A creative approach by servicemen to their duties, and boldness in the tackling of complex problems help in the end considerably to enhance their self-awareness.

[Question] The new political thinking is clearly reflected in the foreign policy of our country. In what way has the new thinking influenced Soviet military doctrine?

[Answer] One of the basic realities of the present-day world is that there is no acceptable alternative to peaceful coexistence between countries with opposed sociopolitical systems. The new thinking engendered by the modern world persistently calls for an end to the arms race and a search for ways of disarmament. These principles have found their reflection in Soviet military doctrine, which represents a system of basic views on the prevention of war and armed forces development.

Soviet military doctrine has a defensive character, with defence regarded as the principal form of military operation in repelling aggression. Proceeding from this, the Soviet Union is building up its Armed Forces on the principle of adequate defence.

Such an important doctrinal provision as renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons also accords with the new thinking. In this lies the fundamental distinction between Soviet military doctrine and NATO's doctrine, which provides for the first use of nuclear weapons under certain circumstances.

[Question] We often speak of education through historical example. How is such education conducted in the army?

[Answer] The inculcation of a cautious attitude to the past and to tradition and continuity in our historical development should occupy a special place in the training of future defenders of our country. Young people joining the army must clearly realize what they have been called upon to defend.

Our patriotism is inseparable from our history. The sources of one's love for one's country may differ, but the main thing here is unquestionably a knowledge of its history.

We have always drawn our strength from history. This was particularly evident in the years of trial that befell the Soviet people. This continuity was strikingly revealed during the Great Patriotic War. It is no accident that the orders of Alexander Nevsky, Bogdan Khmelnitsky, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Ushakov and Nakhimov were instituted in those stern years.

Education through historical example and the heroic past, through revolutionary and combat traditions, should determine our whole approach in training the present generation of defenders of our country.

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Academic Roundtable on Meaning of 'Reasonable Sufficiency'

52001059z Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE in English No 12, Dec 87 pp 2-9

[Discussion recorded by V. Bogdanov and G. Lokshin]

[Text] The Public Commission on Disarmament Problems of the Soviet Peace Committee has been actively working for many years. Recently its participants held a discussion dedicated to the concept, "reasonable sufficiency," propounded by the 27th CPSU Congress.

Taking part in the exchange of views were: L. Semeiko, D. Sc. [History], from Institute of U.S.A. and Canada Studies; S. Fedorenko, Cand. Sc. [History], from Institute of U.S.A. and Canada Studies; A. Yefremov, D. Sc. [History], from Institute of the International Working-Class Movement; Admiral [Ret.] A. Astafyev from Institute of the World Economy and International Relations; A. Nikonov, D. Sc. [History], from Institute of the World Economy and International Relations; Yu. Streltsov, Cand. Sc. [Geography], from Institute of the World Economy and International Relations; A. Kireyev, Cand. Sc. [History], from Moscow State Institute of International Relations; G. Sturua, Cand. Sc. [History], from Institute of World Economy and International Relations, and V. Zhurkin, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences from Institute of U.S.A. and Canada Studies.

Below is an abridged record of the discussion.

L. Semeiko. The "reasonable sufficiency" problem, apart from what had been said about it at the Congress, was practically not discussed by our mass media. As a result, the problem is interpreted in so many ways.

Many think that it's the equivalent of the balance concept. If this is the case, there's no need inventing another term. I think this is a new and very important Soviet concept. It is military-doctrinal and political, since it is included in the principles of a universal system of international security, the military section of which has an item about reasonable sufficiency and the concept of building up armed forces, and answers the question: "What is sufficient for defence?"

I would suggest such definition (although, definitions have always been disputable): reasonable sufficiency of military potentials in their level and character of military activity which secure the solution of military tasks and prevention of war by lowest possible forces and means with the approximate military balance preserved.

Such stability may have several criteria, the first one is to have such military potential which would not evoke worries in other states about their security, or figuratively speaking, must not be of a threatening character. The second criterion concerns the opponent as well: we, too, would feel free of an impending threat. Consequently, the other side must also have a corresponding level. And the third principle: reasonable sufficiency of military potential provides reliable defence of our state interests. Thus, if the first two criteria speak about what we must have "lower," the third one shows what we must have in order to defend our state interests.

I'm against "reasonable sufficiency of nuclear potential" because there is nothing reasonable in it. The possibility of multiple destruction of the other side must not be considered reasonable, even its single destruction is unreasonable.

Now about conventional weapons. Neither NATO nor our forces be considered reasonably sufficient at the moment. Why? Because they contradict the above criteria. The military power of each side causes the other side worry since a sudden attack is possible. And that is the reason for the present consultations between the Warsaw Treaty countries and NATO in Vienna, in particular, about how armed forces and armaments in Europe must be reduced to exclude the possibility of a sudden attack.

The following example illustrates the necessity of maintaining the balance within the framework of reasonable sufficiency: one side has, say, 100 pieces of weapons, while the other—90, and maybe even 80, because less armaments are needed for defence than for offence, in principle. Still Clausewitz wrote that the offensive side must have three times the forces of the defensive. Therefore, if we want to have true reasonable sufficiency of our armed forces it can be even less than that of a potential enemy (in absolute figures).

Reasonable sufficiency is, of course, not only a numerical strength, and it would be wrong to have in mind only the number of tanks, airplanes, etc. The structure of the armed forces must also be taken into account.

In this case, the forms of realization of reasonable sufficiency will occupy first place. I'll give some possible variants.

1. Removal of one-sided preferences. Generally speaking, we are doing this now by giving up medium-range missiles in Europe, though we have more warheads on these missiles than Americans. And we are making still greater concessions in shorter-range missiles, i.e., with the missiles of less than a thousand km. The fact that we are unilaterally giving them up is a step for the realization of the reasonable sufficiency concept.

2. Unilateral reduction of conventional armed forces. A classical example: 20,000 men and 1,000 tanks were withdrawn from the GDR in 1980.

3. Asymmetrical response to enemy's actions. For example: SDI and our possible counter-measures. Or: the enemy has developed a thousand tanks. Within the framework of reasonable sufficiency, it is unnecessary for us also to develop a thousand tanks. We can develop a thousand anti-tank means. This is also an asymmetrical response. The matter is, in the strategic sphere it is impossible to make an adequate response to the increase of offensive weapons by defensive ones while in the conventional sphere it is possible, in general.

It may sound paradoxical, but stepping up combat capabilities is a form of defence. The limits of sufficiency is dictated not by us but by U.S. and NATO actions.

4. A complex moment—liquidation of troops intended for conducting deep offensive operations. It would be possible, within the framework of reasonable sufficiency, if not to liquidate then to reduce first of all tank forces, bomber aviation, airborne troops, marines.

Such actions, even unilateral, would demonstrate that the given side adheres to a defensive military doctrine. I repeat, what is important is not only the amount of armed forces and their defensive character, but also the form of military activity.

The defensive character of military doctrine can be seen from such steps as the obligation not to use nuclear weapons first, reduction of the scope of military exercises, reduction of the scope of offensive operations in these exercises, reduction of concentration of troops in the most accessible directions, and withdrawal of the most dangerous offensive weapons from a zone of contact of blocks.

In principle, if reasonable sufficiency is realized, we would have the situation we had during the Great Patriotic War at the Karelian front. A stable entrenched

front from Onega Lake to Murmansk did not have offensive capabilities and stood firm till October 1944 when Finland capitulated. Or the confrontation in the Far East when neither we nor the Japanese had the opportunity to cross the border and launch an offensive. That was why military operations did not take place there till 1945.

So, ideally, reasonable sufficiency has three components: absence of mass destruction weapons, limitation of military potentials (quantitatively and qualitatively) by limits enough for equal security, and changing the character of military activity of armed forces which, in turn, would confirm the defensive nature of the military doctrine.

S. Fedorenko. Lev Semyonovich, you've said that our and enemy combat capabilities must be equal to each other. But why? Maybe this is a prescription for an endless buildup of our combat capabilities if the other side continues to build up a potential of the same scope? I think that combat capabilities or potential is a function of requirements, but our requirements differ greatly from those of the enemy.

The United States, for example, set itself a goal to establish control over three or four oceans and to have 600 combat vessels in its Navy. Is it necessary to repeat the U.S. example and have 600 vessels for us? Our Navy has a little over 600 surface vessels but their total tonnage is less. Is it expedient for us to do the same or have we our own interests in our defence policy?

L. Semeiko. In principle, if the enemy continues to build up its military power in the 90s on sea, in the air or on the ground, then we, following our reasonable sufficiency concept, must also build it up to make our defence strong, but it is important not to create the so-called "super concept" as we did before. There will be a reaction, but it must be reasonable.

S. Fedorenko. I'll put a more simple question, but it will perhaps provide an answer for all of us: What is the purpose of the reasonable sufficiency concept and what is its main sense for us?

L. Semeiko. I think, not an economic one. The main sense is to preserve peace in this way—and this is a new way which leads to the restructuring of our military-political thinking.

A. Yefremov. That means the idea is to get rid of excesses and to have only what is necessary? To optimize our military potential according to our requirements or, as I understand it, to reduce to a minimum our efforts in defence?

A. Astafyev. Let's clear it up. The other side has more striking means and it does not want to reduce them. This is the reality. The present confrontation, as you know, is

the counteraction of two wills—ours and theirs. Unilateral concessions and unilateral compromises are conducted not for the sake of the compromises as such but for obtaining some concrete goal.

And if the other side does nothing in response? Development of their armed forces, and everything which is being done in control systems, development of weapons and everything we see confirms that they are conducting qualitative modernization, building up their combat power, effectiveness, offensiveness and the like. The factor of the other side, I think, must also be taken into consideration.

L. Semeiko. One of the criteria of our concept is clearly defined: to have enough forces to feel ourselves confident.

A. Nikonov. Is it enough? This is the main question. For obtaining security, our interest or something else?

It seems to me that the reasonable sufficiency concept is not only a military but a foreign policy concept as well. If one side has global and chauvinistic goals, that means the level of its reasonable sufficiency will be rather great. If we set ourselves some other foreign-policy goals, then, naturally, the level of our defence must be corrected, too. Here, of course, our economic capabilities and, mainly, the priorities of our society, as compared with Americans, play an essential role. We must build our reasonable sufficiency proceeding from this.

This theme becomes more important with each day in military-political, military-economic researches and practical policy. Of course, we have a great deal of problems now. For example, is this concept for the whole world or only for us? I think it is for the world as well as for us. Hence, naturally, goals are different. Why? If for the whole world, it must be mutually acceptable. If these are unilateral proposals, it will be simply air bag, without any resonance from the other side.

Yu. Streltsov. I think, we must consider reasonable sufficiency both as a really existing model and as an ideal one. I'll begin, for the sake of simplicity, from an ideal model. In what way must disarmament be performed and how should reasonable sufficiency be achieved so that no one could make an attack? Ideally, we propose something in this way. But neither the present situation nor the experience of the past give us hope that such an ideal will correspond to the level of reasonable sufficiency for defence. We can hardly come up to this in the near future. That means we must speak about sufficiency which can be really achieved. So, first—what can we do by using the reasonable sufficiency criterion even if the other side does not want this?

We understand that, primarily perhaps due to the parity, which remains and which is sufficiently comprehensive and stable in its changes, we can have security by lesser means. Otherwise, naturally, we would not suggest such

variants which we are proposing now, because this will be detrimental to our own security and the security of our allies. The goal is to throw off "excessive fat." This can be compared with a sportsman who built up excessive weight: he should go to the bath-house, beat himself with birch twigs and throw off the excessive weight. After that he will be quicker, have a better reaction, etc. But, in general, we think not about this. We think that the other side must also be filled with the basic knowledge of a new political thinking and new approaches, and accept the concepts we had worked out together. We do not want to play the role of a higher authority.

This gives us the idea that, first, the reasonable sufficiency concept must be mutual. Unilateral understanding of the reasonable sufficiency criterion will lead us nowhere.

And, second, following from this—there exist different levels of reasonable sufficiency: both under the conditions of existing nuclear weapons (one cannot disregard this now—till the West adheres to this, we must search for a common ground to cooperate) and under the conditions of a nuclear-free world. That's why I think that in the long-term struggle for the realization of the principles of new thinking and the reasonable sufficiency concept, there are also reasonable limits of sufficiency, and during nuclear disarmaments, with nuclear weapons preserved.

S. Fedorenko. It seems to me that the question of defining the purpose of reasonable sufficiency is the right one. And it must be solved at a political level, because having not defined the categories of political and national interests, and security interests, it is useless, to my mind, to talk about what is sufficient to reasonably secure them.

I support Streltsov's opinion: reasonable sufficiency must be both unilateral and multilateral. It will be ineffective if we fail to involve in it our partners and opponents. If we want it to have sense, it is necessary to have an understanding not only of what reasonable sufficiency means but also of what situation we want to achieve in military-political relations with our enemy. For this, we must have at least a common language which is not available today. Everybody speaks about many categories and about such things as stability, non-provocative defence, first strike, etc., but all understand them differently.

And another thing, I do not consider that we must define non-provocative defence with abusive words. This idea represents a great interest and finds support in this country as well. For example, there was the idea of writing a common book "Generals for Peace: the West and the East," in which the ideas of non-provocative defence would be actively and very positively discussed.

A. Kireyev. The goal of our concept is the universal and complete reduction of armaments and armed forces, and maximal limitation of military actions. I would like to emphasize that we are for transforming this concept into policy, into international policy of all states and peoples so that it can embrace all states and the whole globe. Of course, the choice of ways of realizing such a policy is very complicated and it, apparently, will happen only during a period of smooth relations between two groupings of states, even between three, if we take into consideration nonaligned neutral countries. It is clear, perhaps, that this concept must be realized in the shortest period of time. Apparently, an international negotiating mechanism must be formed specially for this theme, without stopping other important negotiations on the control of armaments and disarmament now being carried out. Finally, when the situation permits, the USSR and U.S. leaders have to make high authoritative statements, or an international declaration should be adopted for transforming into action this concept which has become a policy.

G. Sturua. Political interests must be defined and this is the key to the problem. Is this a mutual concept? only for the Soviet Union or for the West as well? Of course, this is a mutual concept. Why? Naturally, we have undertaken all these measures not only to decrease the means for defence but also to compel the opponent to reduce its own military potential and lower the level of military confrontation. If we fail to do this, we won't be able to realize our unilateral reasonable sufficiency concept. What have I in mind? Suppose that we reduce the number of tanks and servicemen in Europe. If, in the long run, this action not only fails to produce a positive effect, but on the contrary, provokes still more aggressiveness, then it is clear that, in fact, we have not done anything new to ensure our own security. From the point of view of logic, technology and computer calculations, we need less, but from the point of view of the opposite side, which wants to preserve this, that has brought about the opposite result. The perception of our actions by the enemy must also be introduced into the reasonable sufficiency concept as a certain integral element. In this sense, our actions may seem reasonable in terms of a formal, computer solution, but they may be fatal from the point of view of a political solution. We must not make attempts to determine what is reasonable sufficiency, apart from a general phrase that reasonable sufficiency is the minimal effort for ensuring our security. Life itself will give the final determination of reasonable sufficiency. It will be in a constant change. If we make attempts to drive the problem into rigid forms, we will put ourselves in a difficult position, and I think that political leadership will simply reject these rigid bulky formulations. They will fetter manoeuvrability and flexibility, and will, in fact, be politically unacceptable.

V. Zhurkin. The formation of the concept of reasonable sufficiency and the introduction of that concept into the political life, the interweaving it into the fabric of

international relations represents a process, and perhaps a prolonged one. It can and will develop only as a component of the proliferation of the ideas of the new type of thinking and as a component of the penetration of those ideas into the state's foreign-policy activity.

Therefore, the reasonable sufficiency seems to me to be a two-side (or even a multiside) concept, and at the same time a one-side concept. Each state must revise its military potential and determine the excesses of armaments which can be subject to reduction which will not shutter the state's security (and there are more than enough of such redundant reserves in the present-day arsenals brimming full of armaments).

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Georgian DOSAAF Chief Censured in Housing Probe

18300161A [Editorial Report] Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA on 16 February 1987 carries on page 2 a 2100-word account of widespread violation of housing regulations in the city of Tbilisi and the Georgian republic, including those committed by republic-level officials, as told to a GRUZINFORM bureau correspondent by S.V. Karkarashvili, chairman of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee People's Control Commission.

According to Karkarashvili, the former chairman of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers and present chief of the Georgian Republic State Committee for Standards Administration, D.L. Kartvelishvili, received permission to move into a new apartment in the city of Tbilisi in July 1986, but did not actually move in for at least 18 months. During this time, he had unauthorized renovations performed on the new apartment, failed to possess a valid residence permit, and incurred living costs which had to be borne by the new tenant in his previous apartment.

Karkarashvili also reveals that G.V. Naneishvili, chief of the Georgian DOSAAF Central Committee was guilty of having illegal renovations done in his apartment and "did not fully realize his responsibility as a leader, and moreover occasionally adopted an aggressive stance in an attempt to protect himself from the unpleasantness resulting from his own actions."

The Central Committee bureau reprimanded both officials, and entered notations in their official party records regarding the incidents. The possibility has been raised of removing Kartvelishvili from his post as chief of the Georgian Republic Administration State Committee for Standards.

Lt Gen Justice Maksimov on Restructuring in Military-Legal Agencies
*18010042i Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Dec 87 p 2*

[Article by Lt Gen Justice S. Maksimov, chief of the Directorate of Military Tribunals: "According to the Laws of Justice." Passage in boldface as published]

[Excerpts] Seventy years ago, on 5 December 1917 the Soviet of People's Commissars approved and V. I. Lenin signed a decree on justice. It was important for the establishment of new, truly democratic legal organs, and this date appropriately went down in history as the date of their origin.

The democratic nature of the organization and activity of the proletarian courts became a most important feature. By decree, for the first time in the country direct elections of courts were established and other progressive transformations were consolidated. They are not only of historical interest, but are topical also from the standpoint of the discussion that has developed recently about the further democratization of justice. For example, already on the basis of the initial decree defense attorneys were admitted to court from the stage of the preliminary investigation. "Citizens of both sexes who enjoy civil rights" could serve in that role. The problem of collegiality in the examination of suits was solved in an interesting way. Whereas, in local courts two regular assessors were included in the examination of a case, there were six people in the composition of tribunals, which resolved more important matters. And, in accordance with a VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] decree of 17 March 1918, issued in development of the first decree on the court, the participation of 12 assessors was provided for in okrug people's courts. This, in particular, consolidated legislatively Lenin's thinking about broad participation of the popular masses in the practice of justice. According to the 7 March decree, regular lists of assessors for each session were compiled by allotment. This was a unique guarantee against the selection of "compliant" persons as assessors to take part in the court. The important role allotted to the people's assessors is also indicated by the fact that they had "the authority to reject for the entire period of the trial the chairman designated for the given session." Moreover, in making the decision the chairman enjoyed only the authority of a deliberative vote.

Based on Decree No 1 on the court, two types of judicial organs began to operate in the republics: local courts and revolutionary tribunals. The latter were established: "for the battle against counterrevolutionary forces..., and equally to resolve cases concerning the struggle against pillaging, predatoriness, sabotage and other abuses." But this does not mean that in all cases they employed harsh measures. In the activity of the Soviet courts their fundamental distinction from the Tsarist judicial organs, true humanism, appeared immediately.

The Soviet government established uniform principles of organization for all courts, including military ones.

In the extreme situation caused by the Civil War, the activity of the revolutionary military tribunals, created by the revolutionary military soviets of the fronts and armies, became widespread. Initially they were not a part of the People's Commissariat of Justice and were organizationally included in the military department. However, after the end of the war all judicial organs without exception, including the revolutionary military tribunals, entered the uniform legal system of the republic.

In subsequent years legislation about the legal organs continued to develop. The main principles of their activity were set down in the constitutions of the Soviet State.

However, it was not always possible immediately and everywhere to implement the democratic principles of socialist justice in practice, and subsequently ensure their continuous strengthening and development. There were numerous reasons for this, both objective and subjective. At first the Civil War interfered. The fierce attempts by foreign and domestic counterrevolution to stifle the gains of October forced us to go to a simplified legal procedure in the tribunals and to grant the authority to judge to the VChK [All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage] organs. In the 1930s and 1940s Stalin's unlimited cult of personality had its effect. It was accompanied by curtailment of democratic principles and narrowing the system of procedural guarantees of justice. In those years many people who were guilty of nothing were subjected to extra-legal repressions, but many errors were also committed by the courts. "As was noted in a report at the ceremonial session dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, "it was a lesson for all generations."

Nonetheless, assessing today the path traversed by Soviet courts, one cannot help but note that they made a significant contribution to the cause of strengthening discipline and lawfulness in the country, and, by the measures inherent to them, ensured improvement of socialist social relations.

The activity of the courts does not boil down merely to the examination of criminal cases. A no less important task is protection of the property, working, housing and other rights of citizens, which, in accordance with the USSR Constitution, can be implemented through the courts. Citizens implement this right by making a statement of claim to the court. Every year substantially more such claims are examined than criminal cases. For example, in the last year and a half in the courts of the Russian Federation alone more than 11,000 workers and employees were restored at work with payment of compensation for time of forced absence in the amount of 2.3 million rubles. On 1 January of next year the "Law on the procedure for making complaints to the court about

unlawful activities of officials that infringe upon the rights of citizens" goes into effect. It substantially expands the bases according to which citizens can appeal for protection of violated rights directly to the organs of justice.

The CPSU Central Committee Resolution, "On the further strengthening of socialist justice and law and order and increasing the protection of rights and lawful interests of citizens" defines the basic measures for restructuring the work of Soviet courts, the essence of which are to enhance their role in implementing a policy of accelerating the socio-economic development of the country and the democratization of all aspects of social life. This policy is inseparable from strengthening socialist legality and law and order, ensuring reliable protection of the constitutional rights and legitimate interests of Soviet citizens, and strictly observing the principles of social justice.

In restructuring the work of the courts an important role is allotted to improving legislation and publicizing various aspects of their activity. Competent commissions have been created and are functioning to prepare proposals of a legislative nature, directed at enhancing the authority of the courts and the role of the people's assessors and defenders. Measures will be taken to improve the legal procedural codes. M. S. Gorbachev, in his recently published book on restructuring and new thinking, noted that the goal of the legislative-legal work being carried out is to "increase the role of the court as the elective organ that stands closest to the population, and ensure the independence of the courts and strictest observance of democratic principles of legal procedure, objectivity, conscientiousness and glasnost."

The election of judges held in the country on 21 June of this year became an integral part of the process of restructuring. More than 12,000 people's judges were elected. High demands were placed on the candidates. Not only professional knowledge was considered, but also such personal qualities as a developed sense of justice and heightened sense of responsibility for fulfilling one's duty.

The military tribunals, as an integral part of the state legal system, now solve tasks that are uniform for all courts. Their efforts are also directed at enhancing the effectiveness of justice and rendering more effective assistance to command and political organs in strengthening military discipline, preventing offenses, and eliminating the causes and conditions that facilitate them. As on all Soviet courts, important educational functions are given by law to the military tribunals. In carrying them out, public legal processes held in military units play a special role. Military personnel present at these processes receive object lessons in respect for law and are assured of the inevitability of punishment. Judges take part actively in the legal education of military personnel, and render legal and methodological assistance to comrades' courts.

As they improve legislation and the practice of justice, the CPSU and Soviet State display constant concern about strengthening the activity of Soviet courts, seeking to ensure that they become, in the words of V. I. Lenin, an ever more effective weapon of "education for discipline." Lenin's ideas, many of which were set down in the first decrees on the courts, even today in the period of revolutionary restructuring, serve as a reliable reference point on the path of further democratization of socialist justice.

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Col Gen Babyev on Afghan Veterans' Benefits
18010042h Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Nov 87 p 6

[Interview of Col Gen V. Babyev: "Benefits to Servicemen Fulfilling Their International Duty." Passages in boldface and italics as published]

[Text] The editors of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA receive many letters whose authors are interested in benefits for servicemen fulfilling their international duty. In this regard our correspondent requested that Col Gen V. Babyev, chief of the Central Financial Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense, answer the readers' questions.

As is known, for a number of servicemen military service is associated with fulfilling their international duty. Many readers are interested in whether any benefits are provided for these servicemen?

The service of servicemen fulfilling their international duty frequently takes place under difficult conditions, in a number of instances associated with risk to life. For courage and heroism demonstrated in fulfilling their international duty, many of these soldiers receive state awards. Along with this, taking into account the particularities of their service, by resolutions of the USSR Government and orders of the USSR Ministry of Defense, a number of benefits and advantages have been established for them and their families. Appropriate benefits are granted to these servicemen, both during their service and after their discharge into the reserves or retirement.

What specific advantages do servicemen who have fulfilled their international duty enjoy during their period of active military service?

First it is necessary to note that the time servicemen spend fulfilling their international duty and participating in combat operations is counted toward years of service for pension purposes on advantageous terms — one month of service for three months pension credit.

Officers, warrant officers and extended service enlisted personnel are granted scheduled leaves of 45 days, not counting the time required to travel to and from their

place of leave. Servicemen who have distinguished themselves in combat operations may be presented for the awarding of their next rank ahead of schedule.

Priority housing is provided for servicemen who have returned to the territory of their country, and those who have distinguished themselves in combat operations may be enrolled on a non-competitive basis for study at military educational institutions.

Servicemen who have been wounded, shell shocked or mutilated in combat operations, or while carrying out other military duties while fulfilling their international duty are paid one time allowances in the established amount. When these servicemen receive serious wounds, shell shock or mutilations, after their recovery in hospitals they are sent to sanatoriums or rest houses for one month without charge for the accommodations. Moreover, service personnel who have been wounded, shell shocked or mutilated are given a 50 percent reduction in the cost of a railroad trip once per year (round trip), and in areas not having rail transport, they are granted water, air or inter-city automobile transportation.

What benefits are granted to military personnel who have fulfilled their international duty after their discharge from active military service?

Military personnel who have fulfilled their international duty, after they are discharged from active military service, are given the right to priority housing accommodations, and those who are considered Group I invalids as a result of wounds, shell shock, mutilation or illnesses obtained in combat operations or when fulfilling other military duties, are provided housing out of turn. With the appropriate medical statements, invalids from this group enjoy the right to receive prosthetic devices out of turn, and a Zaporozhets automobile with hand controls.

Military personnel who have fulfilled their international duty, after their discharge into the reserves or retirement, are granted the right to receive an interest-free loan for construction of individual residential housing, in an amount up to 3,000 rubles, to be paid off over a 10 year period beginning the fifth year after the completion of construction of the house. They are granted the right to enter higher and secondary specialized educational institutions on a non-competitive basis, to use their scheduled annual vacation at a time convenient to them, and to receive a supplemental vacation of up to two weeks per year, without reducing their pay. And they have priority rights to obtain accommodations in sanatoriums, dispensaries and rest houses at their place of work, as well as to be received into gardening groups (cooperatives).

Military personnel who have been wounded, shell shocked or mutilated while fulfilling their international duty, during their period in the reserves or retirement retain the right to receive a 50 percent reduction in the

cost of a rail ticket once annually (round trip), and in areas without rail transport, a water, air or inter-city automobile transport ticket.

In accordance with a USSR Government resolution, local soviet organs must pay constant attention to the needs and requests of servicemen who have fulfilled their international duty and been discharged from active military service, and to the families of deceased servicemen.

And what is provided for military personnel who have fulfilled their international duty and become invalids?

Military personnel who have become invalids as a result of wounds, shell shock, mutilation or illnesses received while fulfilling their international duty are granted benefits established for invalids of the Patriotic War.

Have any additional benefits been established for the families of military personnel killed while fulfilling their international duty?

Yes, they have. The parents, wives and minor children of military personnel who were killed or died as a result of wounds, shell shock, mutilation or illnesses received in combat operations, or while carrying out other military obligations while fulfilling their international duty are paid one-time allowances in the established amount.

Advantageous terms for designation and payment of pensions on the occasion of the loss of the bread-winner have been provided for the families of military personnel who have died while fulfilling their international duty. In particular, non able-bodied parents and wives of these military personnel are given pensions for the loss of the bread-winner, regardless of whether they are in a dependent status. Wives receive pensions at age 50. Children of deceased military personnel who are attending school are paid pensions until they complete secondary or higher educational institutions, but not after they reach 23 years of age.

The families of deceased military personnel who require better living conditions are provided housing on a priority basis. Housing space occupied by the families of deceased servicemen who receive a pension for the loss of the bread-winner are paid at 50 percent of the normal rent, and excess housing space up to 15 square meters is paid at the normal rent. A 50 percent reduction in utilities payments is also given. Benefits for payment of housing space and utilities are granted to pensioned wives and parents of deceased military personnel, regardless of the type of pension they receive.

Tombstones are erected on the graves of military personnel and other citizens who were killed or died as a result of wounds, shell shock or mutilations received while fulfilling their international duty, at the expense of the state.

Are any benefits provided for workers and employees fulfilling their international duty?

These workers and employees, if they are wounded, shell shocked or mutilated, are paid the appropriate one-time allowance, and in the case of their death, a one-time allowance is paid to their family.

And the final question: On the basis of what documents are the appropriate benefits granted to military personnel who have fulfilled the international duty and their families?

The document that confirms the right to benefits established for military personnel who have fulfilled their international duty is the attestation on the right to benefits. For granting the benefit of paying for passage by rail or other types of transport to military personnel who were wounded, shell shocked or mutilated while fulfilling their international duty, along with the attestation on the right to benefits, coupons for acquiring transportation tickets at a 50 percent reduction are turned in.

The benefits established for war invalids are granted to military personnel who have become invalids as a result of wounds, shell shock, mutilations or illnesses received in combat operations or while fulfilling other military service duties, based on the invalid's attestation on his right to benefits and coupons for acquiring transportation tickets under advantageous terms, which are provided by the organs that assigned the pensions.

The established benefits are granted to the families of deceased servicemen on the basis of certificates issued by the organs that assigned the pensions.

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Making Use of Highly Educated Soldiers, Sailors
18010042j Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Dec 87 p 2

[Article by Col M. Lishniy: "The Soldier With a Graduation Cap"]

[Text] The large anti-submarine warfare ship Komsomlets Ukrainy was preparing for a voyage. The final tests of the readiness of the apparatuses and personnel for combat watch were underway. And there was nothing surprising about the fact that on this day I met both officers from the force headquarters and Capt 1st Rank N. Kulikov, chief of the political department, on the ship. I was surprised by something else. He was involved with something seemingly not characteristic of a political officer. Along with the ship's deputy commander for political affairs, Capt Lt P. Antipin, he was analyzing the manning of the small units with specialists from among sailors and petty officers with higher and incomplete higher education.

"The combat information post is a reliable element," stated Antipin to the chief of the political department. Petty Officer 1st Class A. Mazay alone is valuable. But in the future it will be necessary here to strengthen the group of hydroacoustic specialists. I think we should seek a good specialist."

Something special should be said about Petty Officer 1st Class A. Mazay, petty officer of the combat information post team. He is a well known figure on the ship and in the force. Having obtained thorough and firm knowledge in one of the country's VUZs, after callup into the navy he passed the examination for first class in the shortest possible amount of time, and is recognized as the best shipboard specialist. He has taken part in several sea voyages, and if necessary can replace an officer.

"There are not so many sailors and petty officers with higher and incomplete higher education on the Komsomlets Ukrainy," states Capt 1st Rank Kulikov. "But, with able placement of these people they are a great force. And if you consider that during the time of their service they train at least one good specialist each, how our 'professional potential' grows!"

The political department chief stressed the word "grows," having in mind the immediate future. And I must explain to the reader that a significant increase in military and political training is already being received in this task force, as well as in the entire Black Sea Fleet. This is as a result of a fundamentally new approach to the use of the educational potential of the contingent called up into the fleet. How was it before? The "cream" was picked out from among the inductees. The best educated people were used to man headquarters, directorates and establishments, and the rest went to the ships. In the headquarters draftsmen and clerks with graduation caps sit at papers and man telephones, and on the ships sailors with more modest education toil at control panels, screens and the most complicated navigational and acoustical devices.

"Here we are breaking the old, obsolete approaches," continues Capt 1st Rank Kulikov. "Yesterday's 10th grade graduates now handle the duties of draftsman and headquarters clerk."

A special commission of officers from the fleet headquarters registers inductees with higher education and distributes them, taking into account the military training needs of the ships and units. Priority is given to the most complex and crucial military specialties. In the force, and on the ships when necessary a still more specific adjustment is made. The sailor with a graduation cap (assignment strictly according to specialty remains an unshakable rule) is placed in the section where he is most needed at the moment.

"Let us say that BCh-5 [Department 5] and BCh-7 each already has one such specialist, but in BCh-7 he soon will be discharged into the reserves," stated the deputy

commander for political affairs of the BPK [large anti-submarine warfare ship] Azov. "This means that the new sailor with higher education must be sent there."

They also think about something else on the ships. The sailor with a graduation cap is not merely a man who is well trained professionally, but he is also a better developed member of the sailor's collective on the political and intellectual planes. He will help his coworker understand some complex training issue, and prepare for the political class.

The data indicate that instances of disciplinary infractions are significantly fewer in collectives where the majority of people have higher education. Among sailors and petty officers who have completed VUZs, the number of infractions is several times lower than the average statistical data. This is also natural.

Consequently, we rightfully consider the educational potential of our soldiers as state property. And if this is so, we must relate toward it in terms of the national interest, to improve the combat readiness of the army and navy.

Unfortunately, this problem is not being solved in a businesslike way yet in all military collectives. Units of the Guards Motorized Rifle Proletarian Moscow-Minsk Division, Baltic Military District, are still guided by old measures. I inquired in the political department and force headquarters how many of the soldiers and sergeants among the personnel had higher education. I asked how they were distributed across duty positions; how many of them were section and crew commanders, gunners and gunner-operators. The chief of the political department and chief of staff acknowledged frankly that no one had counted and analyzed this. Naturally, there could not even be a discussion about more effectively using the educational potential of the soldiers and sergeants with VUZ diplomas in the interest of the service. As it turned out, many of them settled in the headquarters (division and regiment). They were found in the jobs of the already mentioned draftsmen, clerks and supernumerary adjutants. Guards Private Ye. Soluyanov, a mechanical engineer, is assigned as a clerk, and Guards Private A. Mironenko, a future doctor, is working as a secretary. And it turned out that two men, Guards Senior Sergeant M. Simtsov and Guards Sergeant Yu. Volgin, were working as clerks when there was only one position, subordinate to Sr Lt N. Bystro, senior assistant chief of staff.

Even the chief of the political department did not hold back from taking into the political department a soldier called up from school. The approach is a simple one: Take the best for yourself.

Thus, there turned out to be seven soldiers with higher or incomplete higher education at the force headquarters. There were 14 in the subunits, directly subordinate to the force chief of staff. There were two or three in each

regiment headquarters. On the other hand, there were only a handful among the commanders of tanks and BMPs [infantry fighting vehicles], guns and mortars, gunners and gunner-operators, and driver-mechanics.

Is not this approach to cadres too wasteful?

"Yes," agrees Gds Col G. Polkovnikov, chief of the political department. And he promises that we will take up thoroughly questions of the more effective use of soldiers with higher education.

Much in the problem of raising the efficiency factor of the educational potential of young men called into the ranks of the Armed Forces also depends on the commanders and political officers of training subunits. Alas, in some of them a wholesale approach still predominates in determining who and what to teach. In one of the regiments of the already mentioned division the overwhelming majority of soldiers and sergeants with higher education came from a training subunit located on the territory of this same military district. And nearly half of the 30 VUZ graduates were taught specialties there that were very far removed from their institute or university specialty. Why? Did not an already existing profession and required military specialty coincide? In many cases they did coincide. People were simply distributed at random.

For example, Jr Sgt K. Kyumnik is a geodetic engineer by profession, and he was graduated from his training subunit as a BMP commander. And Private B. Aytbayev, a teacher by profession, here studied the specialty of topographic geodesist. He is serving in the same regiment with Jr Sgt Kyumnik. He knows that Kyumnik as a topographic geodesist is two heads above him, Aytbayev. It would have been better the other way around: Kyumnik as a topographic geodesist and he Aytbayev as a BMP commander. But that is what was ordered. In the training subunit Private S. Zharov, a physical education teacher, was trained on the specialty of radio-telegraph operator, and Private A. Aliyev, an electrical engineer who has long been familiar with radio-telegraph apparatuses, was assigned as a grenade launcher operator.

In the training subunits I heard from commanders and political officers that the military commissariats apportioned the inductees by specialty and that they were not at fault that everywhere you turn bakers are taught to stitch boots and shoemakers bake pies. Here is old thinking, a backward stereotype of action. The military commissariats assign inductees by specialty in any old way, and the training subunits follow it like a blind man follows a wall. And who intervenes to correct the error?

Apropos of this, military commissariats are a special subject. The registration of draftees, including those with higher education, by military specialties is done without taking into account their civilian professions especially often here. In one of the regiments in the division, out of 30 soldiers and sergeants with higher education, more

than half earned a profession in a VUZ that is very far from the specialty that the military commissariat's office intended them to occupy. Inductee I. Khryashchikov, a graduate of the Leningrad State Institute of Culture and producer of cultural work among the masses, was sent by the Stuchkinskiy Rayon military commissariat, Latvian SSR to a training subunit to master the specialty of BMP commander; the same B. Aytbayev, a teacher with five years experience, was sent by the Leninskiy Rayon military commissariat in Omsk to a training subunit to master the profession of topographic geodesist; and geodetic engineer K. Kyumnik, a student at the Estonian Agricultural Academy, was also sent to learn the profession of BMP commander by the Tartu combined city military commissariat.

Adjustments were not made either in the training subunit or in the unit where they are already completing their service. The results of this approach are lamentable. First, the people do not contribute what they could to enhancing combat readiness. Second, tremendous forces and resources are spent to retrain them.

Could the educational potential of our soldiers be used with greater effectiveness everywhere? It could of course. This is all the more true in that experience already exists in Black Sea Fleet units, and other military collectives and military commissariats.

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Obituary: Gen Army V. A. Belikov

18010042a Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
15 Nov 87 p 3

[Unsigned Article: "General Army Belikov, Valeriy Aleksandrovich." Names in boldface as published]

[Text] The USSR Armed Forces have suffered a serious loss. On 12 November 1987 Army Gen Belikov, Valeriy Aleksandrovich, commander-in-chief, Group of Soviet Forces Germany, CPSU Central Committee candidate member and USSR Supreme Soviet deputy, died suddenly. He devoted his entire conscious life to selfless service of the socialist homeland and the Communist Party, a member of which he became in 1949.

V. A. Belikov was born in 1925 in Morozovske, Rostov Oblast. After completing secondary school, in July 1942 he was called up into the ranks of the Soviet Army. He participated actively in the Great Patriotic War.

After the war he completed the Military Academy of Armored Forces, and then the Military Academy of the Armed Forces General Staff. He subsequently occupied a number of command positions. He commanded a regiment, a large unit and a formation. He was 1st deputy commander of a military district, and commander of the North Caucasus and Carpathian military districts. Since 1986 he was commander-in-chief of Group of Soviet Forces Germany.

V. A. Belikov was distinguished by his thorough knowledge of the theory and practice of troop training and indoctrination, his closeness to people and his high sense of responsibility for the work entrusted to him. He worked a great deal to improve the military and political training of the personnel, and displayed initiative, firmness and persistence in achieving his assigned goal.

V. A. Belikov combined the fulfillment of his official duties with active participation in social and political life. He was elected a delegate to the 26th and 27th CPSU congresses, and a deputy of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The Communist Party and Soviet Government greatly appreciated the services of V. A. Belikov to the homeland. He was awarded two Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, the Order of the Patriotic War First Degree, the order "For Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces" Third Degree, and many medals.

The vivid memory of Valeriy Aleksandrovich Belikov, loyal son of the Communist Party and the Soviet people, will be forever preserved in our hearts.

M. S. Gorbachev, V. I. Vorotnikov, A. A. Gromyko, L. N. Zaykov, Ye. K. Ligachev, V. P. Nikonov, N. I. Ryzhkov, N. N. Styukov, M. S. Solomentsev, V. M. Chebrikov, E. A. Shevardnadze, V. V. Shcherbitskiy, A. N. Yakovlev, P. N. Demichev, V. I. Dolgikh, Yu. F. Solov'yev, N. V. Talyzin, D. T. Yarov, A. P. Biryukova, A. F. Dobrynin, A. I. Lukyanov, V. A. Medvedev, G. P. Razumovskiy, I. V. Kapitonov, S. F. Akhromeyev, V. G. Kulikov, P. G. Lushev, A. D. Lizichev, N. I. Savinkin, Yu. P. Maksimov, Ye. F. Ivanovskiy, I. M. Tretyak, A. N. Yefimov, V. N. Chernavin, M. I. Sorokin, S. K. Kurkotkin, V. M. Shabanov, N. F. Shestopalov, V. L. Govorov, D. S. Sukhorukov, A. I. Sorokin, V. S. Nechayev, D. A. Volkogonov, N. V. Ogarkov, A. S. Zheltov, B. P. Utkin, M. N. Tereshchenko, N. A. Moiseyev, I. V. Fuzhenko, A. K. Fedorov, V. V. Skokov, Ye. N. Makhov, L. S. Shastko, G. M. Donskoy.

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Obituary: Lt Gen M. G. Fomichev

18010042b Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Nov 87 p 6

[Article: "M. G. Fomichev." Names in boldface as published]

[Text] Retired Lt Gen Fomichev, Mikhail Georgiyevich, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, has died following a serious illness.

All of his conscious life M. G. Fomichev devoted to selfless service of the socialist homeland, the Soviet people, and the cause of the Communist Party, in the ranks of which he entered in 1939.

M. G. Fomichev was born on 8 October 1911 in the village of Sloboda, Belevskiy Rayon, Tula Oblast, into the family of a poor peasant. Having completed the Orel Armored School, the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] Motorization and Mechanization Academy, and the Military Academy of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov, he devoted 40 years of his life to the cause of defending our homeland, and went from cadet to lieutenant general. He participated in the Great Patriotic War from 1941 through 1945. He served in responsible positions in troop units and in the main inspectorate, USSR Ministry of Defense.

In all areas of service entrusted to him, M. G. Fomichev displayed exceptional diligence and energy, and high competence and principles in accomplishing the assigned tasks.

The Communist Party and Soviet Government greatly appreciated the services of M. G. Fomichev. He was awarded two Gold Star medals, the Order of Lenin, two Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov Second Degree, Order of Kutuzov Second Degree, Order of the Patriotic War First Degree, three Orders of the Red Star, and many medals. The bright memory of Mikhail Georgiyevich Fomichev, loyal son of the Communist Party and Soviet people, will remain forever in our hearts.

D. T. Yazov, S. F. Akhromeyev, V. G. Kulikov, P. G. Lushch, A. D. Lizichev, Ye. F. Ivanovskiy, M. I. Sorokin, D. S. Sukhorukov, O. F. Kulishov, S. A. Stychinskiy, M. M. Sotskov, S. I. Klyapin, Ye. V. Kalashnikov, I. Ye. Buravkov, V. K. Korobov.

9069

**Alternative Service for Religious Objectors
Discussed, Rejected**
180100421 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in
Russian 22 Nov 87, p 3

[Article by G. Gukasov: "A Victim of the Jehovah's Witnesses?"]

[Text] In the last few days a single heavy feeling has not left me. No matter what I do: walk along the street and admire the bright colors of autumn, watch television, talk with friends, play with my two-year old daughter and answer her innumerable questions, and suddenly, just like a pin prick of a sharp game I remember: 19 year old Viktor Bogdanovich Dubenskiy is deprived of all of this. He cannot, as he usually did, walk through the streets, in bloom with the last vivid colors of autumn, blending into the common stream of workers, and pass by the gate keeper at the gate keeper's office of the Yulemiste Affiliate of the Tallinn Bus Association who always smiled at him affably, open his locker with his own key and change into his light, modern worker's coveralls. He cannot examine his joiner's bench critically to see whether all the tools are in place, and open the

hiding place where he put the spare parts that are in the shortest supply in the evening. An automotive joiner 3d grade cannot do any real work without real tools and a good supply of wires, cables, resistors, anodes, and many other things.

He could not work otherwise. And now he does not have that joyful feeling of the end of the work day, and the anticipation of a free evening. He will not walk to Filtri Street, to the room that he is familiar with down to the spots on the wallpaper, where his wife Viktoriya and three-month old son Sergey always waited for him impatiently, especially now. Now he is denied this. And not for a day or two, but for 731 days, having begun his bitter count on 22 December. That is how long the people's court determined for him as punishment.

Our story has an ordinary beginning and an entirely natural end. The whole biography of Viktor Dubenskiy, as for any one his age, fits on a page of a school notebook. He was born in the village of Sokoluk, Kirgiz SSR, came to Estoniya in 1977 and lived in Koze, and completed eight grades of Vaydaskiy school. At 16 years of age he went to work, first as an assistant at the Yygeva Inter-Kolkhoz Construction Organization, then as an apprentice fitter at the Tallinn Bus Association. In its affiliate, Yulemiste, he rose quickly up the workers' ranks. In five months he was already a fitter 1st grade; after a year a 2d grade; and after another year a fitter 3d grade. About his social and production demeanor they don't say anything better than Ilmar Lang, the director of Yulemiste Affiliate said: "Reference. Viktor Dubenskiy arrived in January 1985 as an apprentice fitter in automotive repair and showed himself to be a responsive and disciplined worker. He showed interest in his selected specialty. His rate of work is very fast and the quality is good. He successfully combined work with study in secondary school. He is modest and self-controlled." I will say right away that every word here is true. Moreover, I heard many good words and high epithets from all those with whom I talked.

On 17 April of this year greetings from the Kharyuskiy Rayon military commissariat were in his mailbox, on the need for "Draftee V. Dubenskiy to go to pass the medical commission." He went. He appeared before the doctors. Height—178 centimeters. Weight—68 kilograms. In the draftee's card were written: surgeon—healthy; neuropathologist—healthy; therapist—healthy. The summary by the medical commission chairman: Fit. And suddenly this: "At the commission I stated," V. Dubenskiy will write later, "that I refused to serve in the army on the basis of my religious convictions, being a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses Community, which forbids taking up arms and learning to fight. At this time I do not change my convictions and also refuse army service, knowing that I will bear criminal punishment for this." The officers of the military commissariat immediately went to work with Viktor. They explained, questioned

him, and tried to convince him. They brought up examples, citing history. Russian and world history. Civilian and religious. They recalled the Jesuits and the crusaders, sectarians of all shades and stripes.

"To the military commissariat from V. V. Kuzerinaya, teacher at Evening School No 8. I know Dubenskiy as a completely Soviet man, and a capable and serious graduate of the school where I work. His refusal to serve in the army was more likely dictated by a son's duty to his parents. He loves his parents very much and is afraid to bring them unpleasantness. When now the question has been raised about his own family and his responsibility for his own child, perhaps his position will change. I am a member of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], and a non-believer. I ask you to give me some time, and hope that I will be able to convince him."

They heeded the request of his wife and gave him a six month deferment from callup. Then everything was repeated all over again. The officers of the military commissariat no longer referred to all kinds of historical precedents. They tried to find a way out of the situation, but no matter what they said, there sat before them a boy, and many of them had their own sons.

"Think," they said to Viktor, "two years in prison is a minimum. Exactly the same as in the army. And say that you serve in the mess hall, in today's peacetime army you won't have a rifle in your hands for your whole time of service."

"I cannot take an oath," asserted Dubenskiy stubbornly. "We must not make any oaths." It was an impasse. It means that he can give an oath to Jehovah, but not to his homeland! Religion, the officers marveled.

"First you go through the course for the young soldier," they had still not lost hope of tearing the lad away from his religious environment, "and there already you will decide everything for yourself. Such brave soldiers have already come from members of your sect."

"I will not become one."

V. Dubenskiy firmly held his ground: any punishment, only not the army. His responsibility to his just-created family and his growing son could not dispel his religious intoxication. His relatives, mother and father, and non-relatives, but fellow believers, his spiritual brothers and sisters, were in court. They were of different ages, but all seemed to have the same face: closed lips, eyes with the look of suffering, exactly like icons, heavy arms set on their knees. And their only parting words to their son and brother: Pray. And the only solace: We will pray for you! And when yet another of many brilliant references was read in court, this time from evening school, then public defender (?) B. Poopu spoke and asked in the name of the collective of the Yulemiste Affiliate that V. Dubenskiy be sent to serve his sentence to his home

automotive garage, a kind of chain began to form. Outstanding working and school references, a public defender from his labor collective, the suffering faces of his brothers and sisters in Jehovah, his parents, who had condemned their son with a single word. And the atmosphere of the court itself, the dry words of the report, the complete lack of repentance on the part of the convicted person, to the contrary his resigned acceptance of his punishment as something irreversible, and the face of V. Dubenskiy, who received the crown of thorns as though from the hands of the creator of everything in existence, and prepared from this hour to bear it to the end. It was the solemn face of a man prepared to suffer for his faith, who had finally obtained that opportunity.

I thought, perhaps something is not right? Perhaps the law is too strict in its approach to a person in a religious fuddle? Perhaps, we could really leave his God with him, and create in our army some administrative teams where such young people could serve their term of service without weapons and without taking the oath. Yes, the Fundamental Law, the constitution of our country, in no way persecutes freedom of conscience and religion. All of these thoughts spun round in the very air of the discussion with many people of the tragic fate of Viktor Dubenskiy.

"You did not note one interesting detail," said M. I. Dimov, a worker in the republic prosecutor's office, a rifle platoon commander in the war, who many years later was chairman of the military tribunal. "It has become for us some sort of a norm of life to grant first to one, and then to another group of the population, certain benefits, advantages and privileges. Both in trivial, and non-trivial matters. The benefit of priority in stores and everyday service enterprises, for housing, for tickets on airplanes and trains, and many other things. Some are open, and others are through concealed channels. Imagine for a minute that we also create benefits for callup into the army based on religious convictions. I am sure that tomorrow there will appear another dozen fully justified desires of certain groups and categories of the population, who would not have any objection to being freed from callup or to serving where it is a bit easier. No, for us, for males, this is not simply an obligation, but a sacred duty, and in its irreproachable fulfillment is the highest justice."

The representative of the soviet for religious affairs in the ESSR gave me a little information.

"We have no limitations on freedom of conscience and religion," stated Leopold Piyp. "At the time of registration of any religious community they only sign a commitment to observe all the laws of the Soviet state, which is entirely natural in any country. Jehovah's Witnesses here are not registered, and we know well the reason for their illegal existence. Their activity is inspired by a foreign center, and in many ways is not in conformity with Soviet laws."

Jehovah did not prohibit V. Dubenskiy from studying in Soviet school and answering his lessons in history and literature. He did not forbid Dubenskiy from telling about the feats of the heroes of the Civil and Patriotic wars and receiving an "A" for his excellent knowledge of the material. But, back in Sokaluk it prohibited him from wearing the Pioneer tie. God allowed Viktor to engage in automotive repair, allowed him to fall in love with his wife and to produce a son, but he forbids him from defending his work and his love! Is this not the epitome of lying and hypocrisy! I understand that the behavior of the military commissariat workers, the public defenders, the schools, and many of my co-discussants is based on compassion. Just a few years ago a man who refused to serve in the army would have been sentenced not only by a court, but the military commissariat would deal with him no less harshly. And his colleagues at work "would not err," and would send to the court a true public prosecutor, and not a "defender." I understand that at this time a tempestuous reassessment of values is going on in society, and that which yesterday seemed unshakable, today already raises doubts, and tomorrow will come crashing down from its granite pedestal. But there are things about which they do not joke. And first among these is defense of the socialist fatherland.

If it were otherwise, if it were with benefits, and according to convictions, think what would happen to us, to us all. And not only in the terrible hour of testing. There is something here that our readers would no doubt agree with me on. In the dock along with Viktor Dubenskiy were clearly not enough of those who fixed this criminal thought in his head. There were not enough parents, and his brothers and sisters in the Jehovah's Witnesses sect. And in fairness all the demands should start with them.

9069

Hazing of Draftees Calls for Glasnost

18010042k Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Nov 87 p 1

[Article by D. Muratov: "I Would be Glad to Serve...." Passages in boldface and italics as published]

[Text] Remember? The callup center. The smell of the station and the disinfectant. Then the troop train. "To the cars!" And the departing draftees do not wave their caps, first, because it is prohibited, and second, because somehow it is awkward to remove it from a shaved head. And in the evening talks with the sergeant on the unused platform about how it would be "there."

"Do they give leave?"

"If you are lucky."

"Bunk beds?"

"Single."

"What about the food?"

"The usual."

And in the end, the main question.

"And your 'old men'... are they ok?"

For a long time we kept quiet about this "military secret" that everyone knew about. We were quiet, thinking that we had to be for the benefit of the cause, for the defense of the country. But, in response to a small letter by a fellow who wrote against the humiliating procedures in his unit (see KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 21 August 1987), the newspaper received letters. People were afraid that Viktor would not be believed, and that his opinion would be considered "personal," and they tried to convince us that he had written the truth. "I also encountered this..." and I had..." yes, this happens..."

Yes, it does. This deviation does exist; in common parlance it is called "dedovshchina" [literally purge or rampage of the "old men;" refers to hazing of new draftees by soldiers in the fourth six-months of service]. There are "cherpaki" ["buckets"], "dukhi" ["spirits"], and "stariki" ["old men"] and there are conflicts among them, officially called non-regulation relationships.

"I just arrived, and they forced me to wash their undercollars and shine their boots and badges."

"They got my comrade up at night and forced him to tell stories to the 'old men' until morning..."

Humiliation.

We are talking about a contemporary phenomenon. And it lives not only in the army. In a technical school dormitory, some office or, say, a corrective labor colony, privileges and local "castes" exist. Of course, in each case the privileges differ—everyday services in one case, bureaucratic in another, criminal in a third. But the important thing is not the differences in their nature, but the similarity of their roots. They are formed in an identical way, through infringing upon someone's rights. Understandably, the "caste" itself will not give up, and will defend its privileges and zones of influence zealously and fiercely, defending for itself the opportunity to live better than others. The openness of the army "dedovshchina," which is under the protection of the traffic control points, makes it possible to look at the phenomenon in an uncamouflaged form. Yes, I understand that the fall callup is going on at this time. I know that, perhaps, this discussion is not timely. But I remember too well the bread-cutter (there is such a job in the soldiers' mess hall) from my own unit who threw loaves of bread into the face of an inexperienced lad, and the mothers' letters on the editors' desk demanding: Do not stop what you have begun, so that our children can serve

calmly. So, we will continue. And as our first order of business let us explain out of what kind of dough these very "old men" come, and what they think about themselves.

Guardhouse. The yard is 10 by 10 meters; enclosed by a concrete fence. In a small annex of the guards facility are two rooms, for privates and sergeants. In the corridor are trestle-cots like those at the beach, which someone named "helicopters." It is retreat. The "helicopters" are scattered about the floor. The soldiers fall on them without undressing. They cover themselves with their greatcoats. Only at roll call does it become clear who ended up here and for what.

"I was arrested by the unit commander for systematic disruption of the daily routine."

"I for deviation from my duties while on mess detail."

It seemed that these were not the soldiers that the editors had sent me here to "sit" with. They are disciplinary infractions. But the secret is in the wording. Later in short conversations (What time was there for long ones? We are working, "concrete - border - asphalt."), a thing or two became clear.

The military construction worker, who had served 18 months (an "old man," that is), "disrupted the daily routine" since he knew that a young fellow in his first period of service would not dare to disobey him and would carry bricks for him.

Another, who had served a year (a "cherpak"), was smoking at the "discotheque." The sink in the soldiers' mess hall is jokingly called a discotheque, and it is actually similar: You have to wash hundreds of "records" (plates). This is hard work. And he gave his part to a new soldier.

Now those who ended up in the guardhouse look despondent. In previously unsettled circumstances their arrogance flew away in an instant, their eyes jump about and they are ready to go crazy at the slightest thing. They are now just as confused as those whom they tried to humiliate. I repeat, just as confused. There is nothing special about them. And a year or a year and a half ago their parents prayed that their son would not meet up with riff-raff along the way. Then their parents could not even think that the mothers of the new conscripts with fear their children.

And themselves they repeat the well-known refrain: "We did it, now let the others..." "Yes, we maintain order in the army..."

Well, despite their denseness, these arguments should be examined more closely.

It is true that the senior soldiers are the bulwark of the commanders. We note, a reliable and necessary bulwark. The senior soldiers (this is also true) maintain order, discipline and the military classroom. But we are talking about the methods by which this is sometimes achieved. And if, for some careerist officer, any means of "hitting the target" are good, the "dedovshchina" becomes his ally. It is, if you wish, advantageous to him.

"Just so there is order in the company; the rest does not concern me." What does not concern him? It "does not concern" him who will stand duty details, scrub floors, clean weapons and clear snow from the assigned territory, etc. And invisible redistribution of duties occurs. The senior soldiers make their albums about their service and watch television, and the "junior" soldiers carry out the work for them. But, this coexistence cannot be peaceful. You see, it is necessary to intimidate, apply pressure and suppress. Non-regulation means of influence do their deeds. Fear of them engenders servility, and a readiness not to serve, but to be a servant — acquire the knack of a lackey, just don't get on the wrong side of the old timers. And a question arises: Strictly speaking, why is order "at any price" advantageous to the commander? In some subunits, and this is no secret, until now people were prepared to assess the state of the military collective solely by outward signs. By the way, this is also the source of dozens of anecdotes that are not complimentary to the army about fur trees dug up for the time of a commission visit, spray-painted grass, etc. Pretense is portrayed as the end result, and dictates the unscrupulousness of the means. And, if the inspectors did not take merely uniform haircuts to be collectivism and military comradeship, possibly one of the reasons for the "dedovshchina" would disappear of its own accord.

Now let us discuss one more stereotype. "We had our turn, now let the others..." Here is what is interesting about this: Why do the new soldiers themselves share in it and why are they not surprised? Why are they so willing to subordinate themselves and accept the rules of the game that are foisted on them? Could it be simply that they don't know any other rules?

And here we will talk about... glasnost. Knowledge about the army of our draftees begins with the common expression: "There they will make a man out of you," and ends, as is correctly noted in many letters, with the transmission "I serve the Soviet Union," most often avoiding the dark sides of army life. Stories from former servicemen fill the gap. Some have said precisely: "Get ready for the first six months. They will drive you. Be patient, later you will get your turn."

Submission to this information, and the intention to structure the model of one's behavior in accordance with it, is one more of the reasons for the "dedovshchina."

Glasnost can also root it out, through an open, non-bureaucratic discussion of the problems of military collectives. It will not undermine combat readiness. And there will be confidence that no one will show up and be able to get even on the sly. It is high time to have a discussion about democratization of some aspects of army life. Since the caste system, window-dressing and resignation will not be trampled down and extinguished in any other way.

Here is a fact that seemingly is not related to our topic.

Not so long ago in "N" unit Maj Yu. Bochkarev, deputy for political affairs, ordered the komsomol members to give a recommendation for the admittance of serviceman Nadzhafarov as a party candidate member, without having held any komsomol meeting at all! He himself composed the extract from the minutes. And he had it rewritten completely. And what happened? He ordered it and it was rewritten. High-handedness at the "high" level results inevitably in imitation at the "low level." Such ordering about of the komsomol meeting and the komsomol organization makes it absolutely helpless and incapable of defending its interests. We are speaking about the process of democratization, which is gathering strength, and about competitiveness in promotion to komsomol work, and the komsomol committee secretaries of major subunits in general are essentially not elected! That is, the ritual of elections itself exists. But there are no choices. Since an officer or warrant officer can occupy the position of komsomol committee secretary.

Needless to say, it is silly to dispute the principle of one-man command in the army. But, is it correct to ignore democratic norms? Without the process of democratization, and outside of glasnost, the disciplinary measures undertaken by commanders and political officers will not work. The fear will not disappear, but will be cultivated in other, more refined forms.

Yes, all of this is true. And here is the snag. Neither democracy, nor glasnost will be introduced immediately, by fiat, and they will not be checked by an inspection parade. Time is needed for this, time which does not exist. Because the fall callup is already on the way and it recalls these hurried conductors and wonders how it will be met at the KPP [control and check point]. How will it be met?

"We are serving in the Ukraine. In our company are 16 men from the same callup group. And we give you our word that we will not for any reason taunt the young fellows who will soon arrive in the company. We will see that no harm comes to them. They will feel like people."

That is the decision. The most normal decision. To break off the nonsense and derision on one's self. Everything is simple. "He did not pick up the tune in time?" Hold on. Look. On the photograph in the new service records these lads have a confident appearance. They, with their competent looks, are needed by us all.

Question on Female Entry to Officer Corps
18010323 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Feb 88 p 4

[Unattributed article: "It is possible to realize a dream." Passages in boldface and italics as published]

[Text] **Many of us dream of becoming officers. Is there a military school where girls might be allowed to study? V. Konovalova, A. Romanyuk**

As the Main Directorate of Cadres of the USSR Ministry of Defense reported to us, girls are not accepted in military schools, but they do have the possibility of becoming officers. Graduates of civilian higher educational institutions, having received a speciality related to military affairs, may voluntarily enter onto active military service and carry it out in vacant officer positions.

Answers were prepared by the Department of External Military Training and Military Educational Institutions of "Krasnaya Zvezda".

Poor Conditions at Hospital Treating Veterans of Afghanistan
18010095 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
19 Jan 88 p 2

[Article by Maj Burbyga, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Callousness. Soldier-Internationalists Sometimes Encounter it Even in a Military Hospital"; major text is preceded by a letter to the editor; Passage in italics as published]

Dear Editor!

The mother of two sons is writing you. My older son, an officer, is serving in Afghanistan, and my younger son is an enlisted man. The reason for this letter is a visit that I made to a military hospital in the vicinity of Moscow where a friend of my older son, Lt Pavel Kolchus, is being treated after having been wounded. I visited the hospital, and I have been upset for several days. If you only saw how the wounded are being kept. They are forced to clean up the premises and the toilets and to fetch their own food. I was told that doctors making the rounds of the wards are not interested first and foremost in the state of the health of the patients but in how they tidied up the area. And what food! It is the same day in and day out—rassolnik [fish or meat soup with salt cucumbers], kasha [porridge]. ... And where are the fruit, vegetables and dairy products? Don't the wounded need them? I worked for 25 years in medicine, but I never encountered such treatment of the sick, and especially the wounded. In my opinion, this is very easily explained: the hospital personnel do not have enough mercy and affection for these people.

N. ARAPOVA.

[Text] I arrived at the military hospital of the Moscow PVO District with Nina Ivanovna Arapova's letter.

"It is all emotion," said Col Med Serv A. Zakalskiy, chief of the hospital, after hearing me out. "Those servicemen who come here from Afghanistan get a supplemental ration and also receive special treatment. It is another matter that we not only have to treat our patients but to educate them as well. There are some among them who do not like the prescribed hospital discipline and procedures."

Turning somewhat cool, Anatoliy Vasilevich began to talk about the problems which could not be solved in any way.

"Well, the author of the letter writes that our patients wash floors and fetch food. Yes, that happens. But what is to be done? The hospital has more than a 60 percent shortage of female orderlies and there are not enough nurses. And there is nowhere to get them. We asked the city health department to send us at least several graduates of the local medical school, and got a flat refusal. They told us outright: they themselves did not have enough medical personnel, and we had our own department and should let it resolve the problem. That is what the attitude is. We are deprived of the opportunity to invite specialists from other localities—everything turns on where residence is registered."

I next contacted V. Sinitsyn, the supervisor of the health department; I described the situation that arose at the hospital with respect to junior medical personnel, and asked: Can't the health department give some kind of help? And I too got a flat refusal. Col Med Serv A. Pakhomov, deputy chief of the medical service of the district, also did not say anything encouraging in this regard. The shortage of medical service specialists is known, but in any case it seems that it will not be possible to correct the situation in the near future.

The problem of a shortage of junior medical personnel in the hospital is really a very critical one. And it has to be resolved somehow. For the question in this case concerns the treatment of those who were wounded while fulfilling their international duty. Those who returned from war. And, alas, who are forever marked by that war. What references can there be here to objective difficulties and divisions among departments? How can one be calm when there is only one medical aid, no longer young and a pensioner, in the entire traumatology department? Thanks to Aleksandra Alekseyevna Kulikova—she continues to work, although the work here is oh so difficult. The traumatology department takes care of soldiers who have received severe injuries, and some of them are paralyzed and immobile. But there is almost no mechanization of any kind. Moreover, the area in which the section is located is not very equipped to receive and support such people.

And at this point something has to be said. During the decades that transpired since the end of the Great Patriotic War, we apparently lost something from our work experience with the wounded. Our clinics, and even our military hospitals, are equipped mainly to handle the sick who have hands and legs and who are capable of moving about and taking care of themselves. The district hospital in question does not even have toilets that are modified for use by the wounded.

"It gets difficult," says Aleksandra Alekseyevna. "I understand: I should leave, but I cannot. How can you leave here? Who will take care of the young boys—they are there like children, small children. . . And they are so good. Whoever can walk and whoever has hands, they will help without fail. They will sweep the ward, and they will bring the food."

The wounded really help, taking on part of the duties of absent junior medical personnel. Moreover, they try not to entrust looking after the "serious cases," those who come into the section, to anyone else. Here brotherly attention and concern for each other is a tradition among them. Lt P. Kolchus, who was mentioned in the letter, told me that during the first days he could not move about by himself. But Pvt A. Vartavichus literally did not leave him alone. He pushed him around in a wheelchair, shaved him and anticipated his every wish.

I cannot fully share the judgment of the author of the letter to the newspaper, but the visit to the hospital left me with a bitter after-taste as well. I do not want to be categorical: the medical personnel, apparently, are doing for the wounded everything that is required of their job-related duties. But not more than this. Let us say that there are some here who have already completed their course of treatment and who are just waiting to be released from the hospital. The majority of them have not seen Moscow. Why, not, they asked me, organize a bus tour, and show them the sights of the capital at least through the bus windows? Especially since, it appears, there has already been one such tour.

I addressed this question to Col Med Serv Zakalskiy.

"Yes, such a tour was organized once in my absence," he replied. "I forbade it. It is not done."

"It is not done". . . Anatoliy Vasilevich used this expression more than once in our conversation.

One is not supposed to watch television later than the hour prescribed in the daily routine. According to the instructions this would seem to be proper. But if a young person is no longer undergoing treatment but is simply waiting to be released? And programs for young people start only after 10 o'clock in the evening. Is it really impossible to accommodate such patients in one ward and to change the lights out hour for them? I cannot

understand why they were not permitted to view the telecast about M. S. Gorbachev's stay in the United States. This was really an event!

Or consider this matter. In a conversation with Pvt K. Markovin I posed this question: What is your greatest wish now? Konstantin mentioned two wishes. First, to get home as quickly as possible. Second, to eat a fancy cake.

Concerning the first wish—to get home as quickly as possible—and it is not only Markovin's wish, a little later about this. As for the second wish, as the sick patients say, it is impossible to buy anything "tasty" in the hospital. And, of course, after several months many of them got tired of soups and porridge. The hospital snack bar that is set up in one of the consulting rooms rarely has anything that is "tasty." Indeed it is set aside for medical personnel. For the sick—it is not done. And for the wounded? At least for those who are awaiting hospital release? Would it really be illegal if a snack bar was set up like those that exist in military units?

It is appropriate here to mention the supplemental ration, which the chief of the hospital talked about. As it later became clear, Anatoliy Vasilevich deceived your correspondent. As long as six months ago, he personally decided to abolish the supplemental diet. Why, and what was the justification?

"It is not done," Anatoliy Vasilevich said quickly. "A supplemental diet is given only according to the findings of a doctor dietitian."

Is that so? It was necessary to turn to the Central Food Supplies Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense, for an explanation. Maj A. Mikhaylenko, chief of the legal group, explained:

"No, that is not so. The supplemental diet is permitted for the wounded, and there are supporting documents for this. A doctor dietitian determines only the variety of products depending on the patient's medical symptoms. Some hospital managers simply do not want to burden themselves with additional concerns. We have already run into similar cases. And our attitude toward them is identical: it is a disgrace.

"Boring. . ." You hear this word more often than others from those who are waiting to be released from the hospital. And the wait drags on as much as 2 and 3 months, and sometimes 6 months. It is boring because there is a lot of free time, but there is nothing to do. Many would like to engage in sports (of course, within the bounds of what is possible), but just where? I dropped by the room which is considered to be the gymnasium, but it has practically nothing for engaging in physical training or sports. Is it really that difficult to equip the place with the necessary sports gear and

training apparatuses? Or, let us say, make arrangements so that the wounded could regularly and without difficulty get newspapers and journals at the newsstand.

These complaints are not directed only at the hospital. Pioneers, Komsomol members, and soldiers in the reserve who served in Afghanistan frequently visit the traumatology department. And this is good: guests are always wanted here. But let us speak honestly: this is not a lot considering all that is possible—to pay a visit, sing a song to the tune of a guitar or to recite heartfelt poetry. Would it not be possible for the Komsomol organization of the medical school to assume part of the functions of the department's medical personnel? And school Pioneer organizations? Is it not within their power to organize a patronage and to assist in tidying up the premises and taking care of the patients. It is likely as well that Komsomol organizations of enterprises could provide substantial assistance. For a starter, let us say, to equip the gymnasium. Everyone can find something to do here. All that is needed is the desire, and initiative. Not in response to an order, but coming from the bottom of one's heart, from the knowledge that each of us is obligated to these soldiers in many ways. And no matter how busy we might be, and no matter how difficult it might be, it is always more difficult for them. This is what is extremely important for each of us to realize. Then there also would be far fewer problems.

I think that it is easy for the reader to imagine the condition of a young person who just completed a course of treatment and who is compelled to languish for several months in anticipation of getting a prosthetic appliance that is being manufactured for him. A hospital is not the kind of an institution in which one can feel serene. But one has to wait. The Moscow prosthetic-orthopedic enterprise supplies the hospital with prosthetic devices. And it fills its orders very slowly, although, as I was told, the periods of wait have been reduced in recent years, and now deliveries are made in 2 to 3 months.

When we became acquainted, Pvt K. Markovin, who has already been mentioned, was beside himself. It seems that the order for the manufacture of his prosthetic device was received in October, and Konstantin hoped from day to day that he would be going home. But days passed, and weeks, but no one could tell him anything specific about the results. He was allowed to drop by the enterprise and to find out what the problem was. He learned: the order was lost somewhere and, of course, the guilty party cannot be found. A new order had to be submitted. In Konstantin's words, there is no energy left to wait again while it is being filled, the more so that they are longing for him at home.

I called up the enterprise, and the phone was answered by V. Lunarskiy, the acting director.

"Give me the order number," he said after hearing my request. "We will try to finish the prosthetic device out of turn in several days."

Fine, if that is the way it is. But the fact is that the others will not get theirs out of turn. And it should be that there is no waiting one's turn, but that there is simply a very short waiting period. Is this possible?

"In general, yes," said Vyacheslav Nikolayevich Lunarskiy. "But on condition that we are supplied everything that is needed. Very often we are let down by the supplier, the Moscow Semifinished Prosthetic Appliances Plant imeni N. A. Semashko. By the way, the plant has its own problems. It is a century old and has long since needed reconstruction. You can imagine what kind of a plant it is."

It turns out that one cannot expect any particular hope of a reduction in the periods of manufacture of prosthetic devices in the near future? But who is responsible for a resolution of this question? I contacted G. Pakhtusov, the chief of the RSFSR Prosthetic Industry:

"Yes, we know: the periods for filling out orders are really long. It is also known that other orders are also being filled in a slipshod way. We are taking measures. The snag is that there are no qualified cadres. But we are seeking a way out. Today we are introducing a system of comprehensive job contracts using economic incentives in the enterprises. Emergency prosthetic teams have already appeared, and they will be able to fill orders in the course of a week.

V. Babkin, the first deputy minister of RSFSR social security, also told me about the measures that are being applied:

"This question is being reviewed at the collegium of ministers, and we are maintaining a check on it. We hope that there will be real changes soon. And not only in a reduction of the periods of prosthetic design and manufacture of more reliable and high quality prosthetic appliances. We proceed from the fact that it is necessary not only rigorously to change the system itself where an

invalid is forced to ride to an enterprise to fill out an order. The reverse is needed: that a team of specialists drive to the hospital and do all that is needed to prepare the orders.

The conversation with Vladimir Alekseyev added some optimism, although he could not say anything definite about periods of time. But we will hope that these changes will take place. And as soon as possible. For here, aside from the moral consideration, there is another consideration—an economic one. The manufacture of a prosthetic device, as I was informed, costs about 100 rubles, but keeping an invalid in a hospital while waiting for a prosthetic device costs more than 10 rubles a day. We can estimate how large a sum this comes to when the wait lasts several months. Thus, perhaps, the matter has to be arranged so that these sums are spent on the development and improvement of the prosthetics system itself?

Now the next group of servicemen is completing its stay in the hospital, and they are departing for their homes and starting a new life. How are things going for them, the invalids? Are they getting support and understanding in their localities, and most important, work they can perform? Not everywhere and always by far. This is confirmed by letters to the editor. These letters vary a lot, and the facts that they cite are generally different as well. But one thing is common to all of them: the callousness and heartlessness of a great number of officials with respect to soldier internationalists, to their misfortune and to their needs. But this is a subject for another discussion. The editorial staff intends to return to it in the near future.

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Restructuring: Frequent Inspections Disrupt Regiment's Training

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published in Russian on 19 January 1988 on pages 1-2 a 1900-word article by Major O. Vladykin, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's Central Asian MD Correspondent, entitled: "Restructuring: The Regimental Link—Business is being Drowned in the Fuss". The article stated that a Central Asian Military District motorized rifle regiment whose socialist competition obligations for 1987 went unfulfilled, unlike the previous year. The investigation into the regiment's failure found that troop training had been significantly disrupted by frequent inspections and related activities which prevented normal training. The combat readiness of the unit was significantly lowered.

In the beginning of June a multi-purpose inspection commission from the higher staff arrived. In order to prepare for and conduct the inspection, exercises were postponed for several days. The departure of this commission was followed shortly by the arrival of another. Thereafter, a number of "demonstration" tactical exercises were held. These concluded at the end of August. "...However, the motorized rifle troops were not able to perform maintenance on their combat equipment before the next warning was received: a commission from Moscow was expected from day-to-day."

"...Following the Moscow commission, the regimental commander received a warning from the higher staff: it would be necessary to prepare for a command-staff exercise. ..." Training was resumed after 10 days. It subsequently was found that the warning from the division staff had been in error.

"...They gave a sigh in the subunits: it would finally be possible to carry out planned training. ..." At that point a helicopter arrived, with orders for a "commission" to carry out a "summary inspection". Six days were available to prepare for it. The practical result of this sort of business was that subunit commanders had essentially no time to conduct individual combat training.

The commander of a motorized rifle company complained that when he did have time available for training and set out to fulfill his plan, he received orders "to detach 10 men to one place, 15 to another, etc. Often no one was left with whom to conduct training."

"...In one of the documents, composed following an inspection, there is, for example, the following notation: 'The basic shortcoming is the great isolation of personnel from duty. In the motorized rifle and tank subunits only 8-10% of the personnel were present for duty.'"

Examination of this general problem also uncovered the fact that not one of the "young" BMP drivers had completed the entirety of the required pre-training course, or made a multi-kilometer march, and were nonetheless, required to operate their equipment independently during inspection.

The author concludes that in the new training year much has to be rethought in order to improve the regiment's combat readiness. The inspectors themselves are concerned with raising the combat readiness of the unit. He points out that the inspection has been "...gradually transformed into an end in itself."

Maskirovka: Heater Used To Simulate SP Artillery Vehicle

18010325 [Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published in Russian on 30 January 1988 a 950-word article on page 1 by Major Yu. Klenov, a student of the editorial department of the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin, entitled: "Engineering Heater! Reporting from an exercise of Camouflage Troops."

The article describes some of the activities of a platoon of camouflage [maskirovka] specialists and some of the techniques used by the engineering-maskirovka platoon to simulate combat vehicles.

The platoon was able to simulate a self-propelled artillery unit. A false set of tracks was laid out, as though a tank column had moved into the area. False gun barrels protruded from cover, and in at least one case a heater was set up to simulate the heat signature of an armored vehicle. Upon questioning, the platoon commander asserted that this was 99

effective.

The exercise also involved the suppression of radar and the use of a heavy smoke screen to "blind" the "...optical-electronic reconnaissance and fire control equipment. ..."

"Indeed, in battle, the importance of maskirovka is difficult to overestimate. To hide equipment, weaponry and personnel means to increase a subunit's survivability, which means in turn to improve the chance for success in the fulfillment of the assigned combat mission. At the front, as is well known, everyone is occupied with maskirovka. The most responsible measures are carried out by engineering units and subunits."

In general the requirements for maskirovka are said to have grown more difficult, given the development of more modern, high-precision combat equipment. This is notably true for modern reconnaissance and detection equipment.

**Response to Complaint on Cooperation Between
Electronic and SAM Units**

[Editorial Report] On 22 December 1988 KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published on page 2 a 250-word letter from Colonel-General of Aviation I. Mal'tsev, the 1st Deputy Commander-in-chief of the Air Defense Forces and Chief of the PVO Main Staff, entitled: "A Slender Thread". The letter is in response to an article published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 10 October 1987 under the same title, which described problems of a lack of cooperation between EW and SAM units and the level of equipment available to forward visual observation posts in the Air Defense Forces. The original article was reviewed by the Main PVO staff.

To decrease the amount of time necessary for information processing, direct communications links will be

established between units. The Main Staff is said to be taking measures to improve supplies of communications equipment to subunits. Currently "The basic equipment of a visual observation post is 6-8 power binoculars." And further "A series of additional organizational measures have been developed to improve cooperation between RTV [Radio-technical troops] and ZRV [SAM Troops] to increase the efficiency of visual observation posts."

An additional answer was received by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA from the Acting Chief of Staff of the PVO SAM Troops, Colonel Yu. Andreyev, and the Chief of PVO Communications Troops, Major General E. Ishchukov. The latter noted that additional radio receivers will be made available

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Discusses Career of Rear Adm V.N. Sergeyev

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA of 23 January 1988 published on pages 1 a 100 word unattributed photo-feature entitled "People of Duty and Honor: Rear Admiral Valeriy Sergeyev" and an accompanying 2500-word article on Sergeyev by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain 2nd Rank S. Turchenko, entitled: "People of Duty and Honor: — Flag Bearing". The photo-feature begins, pointedly with a comment from Rear Admiral S. Kokotkin of the Main Naval Staff that the two have known each other since the early days of their service, and notes that Rear Admiral Sergeyev is currently commander of a detachment of ships in the Indian Ocean tasked with providing security for merchant vessels moving through the Persian Gulf. The remainder of the commentary is highly praiseworthy of Sergeyev's selflessness and devotion to duty.

Turchenko's page 3 article then follows with a description of Sergeyev's current duties and career path. In addition the article includes complimentary commentary on Sergeyev's character from three letters written by Captain 2d Rank V. Yelovskiy, Captain 2d Rank Ivanov, and Sailor D. Sozinov.

As a young officer Sergeyev was well known in the Pacific Fleet as a boxer. In his early thirties he became commander of the cruiser "Dmitriy Pozharskiy".

"It is not only Soviet seamen who know Rear Admiral Sergeyev as the flag officer of the detachment of Soviet warships in the Indian ocean. As a representative of the USSR he has more than once carried out friendly visits and official calls in South Yemen and India, on the Seychelles Islands, in Djibouti, Vietnam and Mozambique..."

He is said to have been promoted to flag rank "many months ago, while at sea. Since that time he has not set foot on the homeland, continuing to remain at sea, aboard ship. His duty is such that he spends 9-10 months per year at sea and does not even have an office ashore. ..."

"...his naval erudition. He has performed all duties from being commander of a gun turret on a cruiser to commander of a large strategic unit and has fulfilled each, judging by his recommendations, brilliantly. His commanders were people as well known to the fleets as Admiral M. Khronopulo and Vice Admiral Ye. Volobuyev..."

Admiral Sergeyev is given similar high praise from a political officer, Captain 2d Rank Yu. Ivanov and from a machinist from the destroyer Stoykiy, D. Sozinov.

Seaman Honored for Heroism in 1986 Nuclear Submarine Loss

18010228 [Editorial report] Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in Russian No 22, 1987 carries on page 18 a 400 word article announcing the posthumous award of the Order of the Red Star to seaman Sergey Preminin for his heroic performance of duty during the loss of a Soviet nuclear submarine which occurred on 6 October 1986. The article states: "Sergey pulled on the mask and straightened the box on his chest which contained the regenerative canister"

"Seaman Preminin had already been in the area of the disaster an hour before that. Senior NCO Yezhov recalled how Preminin, as if justifying his actions had said: 'its very hot there, very hot' For the last four hours without a break he had maintained the watch in the disaster area where the presence of gas in the air forced him to work in a mask; where it was very hot and the pressure was high; where he worked side by side with the threat of death which followed after his every movement"

"Then the situation changed drastically: the temperature rose to 80 degrees centigrade, the gas combined with the steam became a physically perceptible swamp. . . ."

"A short time later came the announcement from TASS that on 6 October 1986 as the result of an on-board accident a Soviet nuclear submarine had been lost. In the announcement it was noted: 'The reactor was shut down. According to specialists, there is no chance of a nuclear explosion or radioactive contamination of the surrounding area.'"

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Serious Flaws Noted in Lithuanian Civil Defense
18010327 Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian
2 Feb 88 p 2

[Article by Colonel I. Patkavichyus, Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Civil Defense of the city of Vilnius, entitled: "Civil Defense: Teaching to Act Knowledgeably in Extreme Conditions"]

[Excerpts] The training year in the city's system of civil defense has been completed. At what level of performance were the exercises carried out? Objectively, evaluating the work which has been completed, it is possible to say that there have been definite successes. The majority of complex exercises and training at facilities and planned educational programs were conducted at a high level, ... [Several examples of effective training omitted].

And all the same, objectively evaluating the results of training, it is necessary to recognize that, as a whole, in preparation for civil defense the key break-through has still not occurred. The inertia of many facility leaders, their incompetence and even neglect of preparations for the protection of the workers and a low level of responsibility for the fulfillment of their responsibilities for civil defense is still being talked about. In the Vilnius production association "Elektrosvar", in the grinding factory and a series of other facilities little attention is devoted to preparation for defense against weapons of mass destruction, as well as the elimination of the consequences of possible production accidents or [actions] in the event of natural disaster.

Formalism and false reporting in the matter of the training of leading personnel has not been overcome. Many chief specialists, not to speak of the commanders of non-militarized formations, did not know the content of the documentation included in their working packets on civil defense, did not know how to provide leadership based upon them [those documents] in the conduct of measures for their own service, or in the development of formation readiness. That situation occurred at the "Komunaras" factory and in construction administration No. 4 of the "Vilnyusstroy" trust—low knowledge and weak practical experience of the formations in the fulfillment of techniques and means of conducting rescue work (the knowledge of which, by the way, is required even in daily life), here they did not know how to use individual medical, antiradiation, and antiche-mical protective equipment.

In the course of the conduct of exercises, it has become apparent that the overwhelming majority of workers and service personnel did not know the civil defense alert signals or the order of actions in accordance with them, the techniques and equipment for providing assistance, the responsibilities of adults for the protection of children, and the rules for the movement of casualties. And indeed that minimum knowledge and practical experience is necessary, not only for the survival of the individual in the conditions of modern warfare, but even for reliable actions in a production accident, or the unfortunate event of a natural disaster.

The organization of training of the non-working population calls forth concern. Until now the basic forms of exercises with them remain episodic discussions and the distribution of instructions. This is clearly insufficient. The workers of the housing-maintenance service must fundamentally change their relationship to this work.

**Military Construction Freight Transport:
Adjusting to Economic Reform**

18010076 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Dec 87 p 1

[Article by Col A. Novosadov, honored builder of the RSFSR: "The Economic Reform — An Examination for All." Passage in italics as published]

[Text] *The collective of the military construction organization led by Col A. Novosadov works year after year stably and profitably, and is the possessor of the competitive Red Banner of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, BTSPS [All-Union Central Trade-Union Council] and VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Young Communist League] Central Committee. The growth of incomes in the collectives markedly exceeds that of wages, and this year the cost-price of goods deliveries declined more than eight percent.*

The contribution of Anatoliy Fedorovich Novosadov to the common cause was also noted. He was awarded the Order of the Labor Red Banner, and the title of honored builder of the RSFSR.

Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of our time, which is marked by revolutionary changes in the economy, the social sphere and people's consciousness, is the need for creativity. The changes that are taking place in our society are not simply opening scope for initiative; they require this initiative from each at his place of work. And how could it be otherwise? After all, there are no prepared recipes for restructuring, and no single circular, instruction or directive, no matter how perfect it may be, can provide an answer for all instances in life.

Today we military construction personnel, like workers in the other branches of the economy, are faced with the task of switching to full economic accountability, self-support and self-financing. Simple economic analysis of our organization, for example, which is engaged primarily in the delivery of goods to builders, showed that if this were done mechanically, without consideration for our specific nature, in the very first year we would lose almost half of our profit. And this means a sharp reduction in the development and incentive funds.

Unfortunately, under army conditions the weight of old approaches to production activity—arbitrary decisions, pressures, instructions not buttressed by even the most simple calculations—is still rather great. It is not easy to rid ourselves of this, but we must do so, because economic laws operate outside of orders and instructions, and they inexorably have their effects. We simply will move nothing forward without fundamental study, on a new basis, of the economic relations among all participants in the investment cycle, and of new norms, prices and rates. For this it is first necessary to inculcate economic thinking in people.

In our organization we have many competent and knowledgeable specialists who are capable of accelerating the transition to the new economic paths; such specialists as Lt Col V. Goryainov and Capt V. Gnusov. But I am sure that we will be able to achieve a true turning point only if economic knowledge becomes a requirement of all: both the managers and rank-and-file workers. Only then will it turn into a real moving force in production.

We began by giving each driver a card, in which the income plan, the planned and actual expenditure of fuel, spare parts and so forth are counted up. By the end of each month the driver knows whether he brought the organization profit or loss. This form of control has had its results, but has not yet changed people's consciousness. We decided to go further and create economic soviets in the subunits. We began with a lagging company, which was commanded by Sr Lt M. Gerasimenko. We had here a unique point of reckoning—a 5,000 ruble loss. In literally a month or two the work of the subunit became profitable.

We satisfied ourselves that the workers and military construction troops were interested in engaging in economic computations and working with knowledge of the overall situation. When one talks in the subunit about how the plan is working out, everyone asks: And how should I plan my work? People become concerned about why the coefficient of equipment utilization was too low and how it could be raised. It became common that a military construction worker might go to the planning department and say: "Why are too few spare parts allocated to my vehicle; after all it is old and its norms should be different." And the norm is reexamined, for there is a common interest here.

I believe that these are only the first shoots of new thinking appearing in the collective, but they are already now bearing fruit. Thus, in this year alone, having reduced the automotive fleet by 10 units, we hauled an additional thousand tons of goods. More than two thirds of the profit came from increased labor productivity. Of course, as it is with any end result, these figures were derived bit by bit from various organizational and technical measures, but perhaps collective economic interest maintained in the brigades operating under cost-accounting played the main role.

Today we have relatively few such brigades, and they accomplish more than a quarter of the volume of freight shipments. Among the best are the collectives of drivers led by Nikolay Afanasyevich Abolmasov, and Aleksey Aleksandrovich Mishukov. They regularly receive prizes for savings of fuel, lubricants and tires. The people see that their good work is rewarded, and they have a sense of collective responsibility for the common cause. This means that the initial components of economic thinking are present.

This is, so to speak, local economic accountability. We have our problems, but we also have considerable experience acquired through the years. And when we speak about the transition of an entire organization to collective contracting, this is still more like a task with many unknowns. Now a great deal depends not only on ourselves, but also on subcontractors and higher organizations. For example, at present we have considerable losses because the vehicles stand idle for a long time at the builders' sites during loading and off-loading operations. It was necessary to set up so-called time clocks that monitored idle time at construction sites. And they were immediately put out of action. Now we are restoring them, and we do not intend to "give up."

A substantial portion of our income is obtained because our equipment is concentrated in one place. We have freedom of maneuver and are able to set up its repair and maintenance. However, such "cooperation" with the subcontractors does not yet promote the development of a collective contract. Moreover, the construction organizations that we support also have their own transport. From our point of view the overall situation is paradoxical: transport exists, but there is no plan governing its use for shipments. It is understandable that every manager wants the vehicles always to be at hand. But, in a system of full economic accountability such a situation would be impermissible; the equipment must give maximum return.

In general I believe that full economic accountability will quickly force us all to "sort out" all existing reserves. Thus, we place great hopes on the use of computer equipment, and namely personal computers. They are significantly cheaper than large computers, and pay for themselves with interest. Already now we are carrying

out "processing" of trip tickets, and mutual accounting with customers. In the immediate future we want to create an entire network of interconnected computers, which will make it possible to optimize shipments, eliminate cross-streams of goods and raise the coefficient of use of motor transport by 50 percent.

Of course, now with the approaching transition to full economic accountability, there is much that is of concern. Problems exist that must be solved or it will simply not be possible to embark upon the new, crucial economic stage. If we look at things realistically, every year we have a rather large number of vehicles that stand idle for months due to a shortage of drivers. The fact is that, for example, now in December we have discharged military construction troops who have completed their service. Simultaneously, we are beginning the process of completing the training of the young generation of drivers. Actually they will come on line only in the second quarter of the coming year. It is understood that the time periods for callup to mandatory service will not be changed. But the problem is acute and it must be solved, as we suffer losses in the millions every year. As before the quality of training of drivers by DOSAAF (All-Union Voluntary Society For Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy of the USSR) organizations remains low. Their "retraining" requires not only significant efforts, but also material expenditures.

Not the use of modern economic terms, and not juggling of figures are required today from leaders of all ranks, but scrupulous and methodical analysis of economic work and existing reserves, and searching for ways to solve problems that arise. Efficiency and specificity will decide success; this will be a serious test for us all.

**Response to Question on Deferments, Timing of
Draft of Students**

18010322 [Editorial Report] Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian of 5 February 1988 published on page 4 a 100-word unattributed article including a letter by Lieutenant Colonel I. Kasatkin. The article is entitled: "When students are drafted".

Colonel Kasatkin states that in the Tyumen industrial institute students are called to active military service during the fall semester and that this has an impact on

the educational process. Moreover, this does not take place only in the Tyumen institute, but elsewhere. He asks when students must be called to active duty.

The response states that students in higher educational institutions having reached 18 years of age are called to active duty once each year, in the spring following the completion of their first course. Students born in the second half of the year receive a deferment and are drafted during the spring of the following year after the completion of their second course. However, those students who are to be drafted in the normal time-frame, but due to sickness or other cause receive a temporary deferment, are called to duty in the fall.

Privileges For Officers' Children Denounced

18010229 [Editorial report] Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 January 1988 carries on page 2 a 2100 word article reporting on a party investigation into corrupt admission practices at the Leningrad Suvorov Military School. The article states: "Last fall at a meeting of the party aktiv at the Leningrad Suvorov Military School Captain L. Novikov stood up to speak. For the overwhelming majority of those in attendance, his short announcement was a completely incredible discovery. And only a few people knew the true state of affairs. They knew the facts, the details, and they could surmise the scale of possible consequences.

"And here is what Novikov spoke about: during the entrance exams certain students who had received 'twos' in mathematics were given a second chance to take the test in violation of existing rules."

"I will say right out that these were the children, not of those citizens who waited excitedly outside the gates of the school for the decision of the acceptance committee, but of those who were certain that their grandchildren and children would be accepted regardless of their level of knowledge. Here, they would say, it is all a matter of technique. I will give their names: Maj Gen V. Rudenko, Maj Gen of Aviation G. Legkikh, Col A. Priymak, Lt Cols P. Samoylyuk, V. Redvanov, A. Oshev, A. Pokhil-yuk, A. Korenev and others—all together more than 20 people.

"This technique, if you will forgive me for saying it, was also employed by Lt Col V. Uzyumov, who was serving as company commander and secretary of the acceptance committee, as well as being senior deputy to the chief of the training section, Lt Col I. Dovgalenko, the deputy commander of the training section temporarily acting as chief, and Maj V. Shlinchak, the personnel officer. They accompanied and conducted from exam to exam, children from that special list, warning teachers to be 'lenient' . . . For one student they arranged a reexamination on the same ticket, others got the opportunity to rewrite the problems which had been correctly solved by instructors."

The article goes on to say that the list of protected names included not only military officers but others, including low level party secretaries who "leaned" on the acceptance committee. It continues, describing the threats and bribe offers which Captain Novikov received as he attempted to expose the scandal. It then includes the author's own struggles with Col A. Kiryushin from the Ground Forces Directorate of Military Educational Institutions over publication of the article.

The author concludes by praising restructuring: "The ideas of restructuring are beneficial, and its possibilities are enormous. But the battle of principles is intensifying The moral climate in the larger party collective is unhealthy and needs to improve. But this is possible only under the conditions of full glasnost and great party spirit." No mention was made regarding punitive actions taken against the offending parties.

UD/336

Voyenizdat Official Surveys Military History Publications

18010210 Moscow *KOMMUNIST*
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian
No 24, Dec 87 pp 78-79

[Article by Col L. Krayniy, editor in chief for military historical literature of Voyenizdat, under the "Criticism and Bibliography" rubric: "Thrilling Lines of Military History"]

[Text] When there are abrupt changes in social development, people always turn to the past, to their own history, for advice. This is not a new idea. The well-known Russian historian V.O. Klyuchevskiy stated it in one of his works. Nowadays perestroyka and its active entrance into our life have determined such an appeal. It can be said that literally before our eyes there has been an increase in interest in the historical past. And today this interest is greater than ever before.

By publishing dozens of books every year on historical military themes, Voyenizdat is making its contribution to the teaching of patriotism and historical thinking to the soldiers of the army and navy. For example, the book "V.I. Lenin. Voyennaya perepiska. 1917-1922 gg." [V.I. Lenin. Military Correspondence 1917-1922] was recently published, the memoirs of D.I. Ivanov "Ya—matros 'Ganguta'" [I—A Sailor on the "Gangut"] just came out, and the following monographies are being prepared for publication: "KPSS—organizator zashchity sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva" [CPSU—Organizer of the Defense of the Socialist Fatherland], "Vozdushnaya moshch Rodiny: deyatelnost KPSS po sozdaniyu i razvitiyu Voenno-Vozdushnykh Sil" [The Air Power of the Homeland: Actions of the CPSU to Establish and Develop the Air Forces], "Soldat revolyutsii: voyenno-politicheskaya deyatelnost F.E. Dzerzhinskogo" [Soldier of the Revolution: Military Political Actions of F.E. Dzerzhinskiy] and others.

Today the collective of the publishing house, taking into account the readers' interest in the history of the homeland and in its military history in particular, is doing much for a comprehensive and in-depth development of this subject. Thus, under the plans of the editor's office for military historical literature, they have begun to issue a new series "Russian Commanders and Admirals." It will include books about A.V. Suvorov, M.I. Kutuzov, P.A. Rumyantsev, M.B. Barclay de Tolly, P.I. Bagration, A.P. Yermolov, and admirals M.P. Lazarev, F.F. Ushakov, P.S. Nakhimov and S.O. Makarov. Monographies are being prepared on Dmitriy Donskiy and Aleksandr Nevskiy and the military actions of Peter I.

The series was opened by the book of P.A. Zhilin "Feldmarshal M.I. Kutuzov" that recently reached the stores of "Voyennaya kniga." It is expected that it will be

followed by the publication of the work of I.I. Rostunov "Generalissimus A.V. Suvorov." It is planned to issue the books of this series in the same artistic design. They will be well illustrated.

Along with the publication of the series on Russian commanders and admirals, the editor's office intends to issue books telling about foreign military leaders. Thus, for the first time in the last 50 years in our country, they are publishing the book of V.G. Sirotkin "Napoleon Bonapart: illyuzii i realnost'" [Napoleon Bonaparte: Illusions and Reality], which shows the military actions of the French emperor and the crushing defeat of the "great army" by the Russian Army in 1812.

A series of six books, "Battles of the Great Patriotic War," is being prepared. They will show vividly and descriptively Soviet military science, the heroism of Soviet soldiers, the living and purposeful party political work, and instructive combat experience. This is precisely the task that faces the authors. We hope that the reader will obtain not only an in-depth and detailed selection of the most important operations of the Great Patriotic War but also a powerful ideological and emotional charge helping to develop in young people a high level of civilization and preparedness to defend the homeland. It is also proposed that the books be well illustrated and presented in a uniform artistic design.

Taking into account the requirements of young people, a book is being prepared on the civil war. It will include a lively and descriptive story of the revolution, Lenin, the Communist Party, the Komsomol, the rise of the Soviet Army and Navy in that difficult and heroic time, communist ideals and the unselfish loyalty of the red warriors and commanders of Soviet authority, the ideals of the socialist revolution, and their unparalleled heroism, firmness and valor. We plan to supplement this book with publications in the same artistic design on the brilliant recollections of the civil war and the most significant artistic works. In this way, the books, taken as a whole, will constitute a library on the civil war.

I believe that the readers will approve of the changes in the series "Soviet Commanders and Admirals." The publishing house is still issuing books in a small format comprising no more than 10 author's sheets. Beginning in 1988, however, the books of this series will be published in a new artistic design, in standard format and containing up to 20 author's sheets. Thus, their appearance will be more solid, brighter and more attractive. The main thing is that the authors have been given the task of telling about each hero of the book at a high literary level and of revealing the facets of his military talent and character traits in depth and in detail. In the pages of the future books, readers will meet marshals of the Soviet Union A.I. Yegorov, B.M. Shaposhnikov, S.S. Biryusov, V.I. Chuykov, K.S. Moskalenko and A.I. Yermenko, Ch Mar Arty N.N. Boronov, Ch Mar Avn A.A. Novikov, marshals of armored forces P.S. Rybalko,

M.Ye. Katukov and S.I. Bogdanov, admirals N.G. Kuznetsov, V.F. Tributs and L.M. Galler, and Army Gen A.A. Yepishev. In this series, manuscripts of books about V.A. Antonov-Ovseyenko and S.S. Kamenov are being prepared. In connection with the fact that the series is qualitatively different, it is proposed that new books be published on M.N. Tukhachevskiy, V.K. Blucher, R.P. Eydeman, G.D. Gay, S.G. Lazo, A. Ya. Parkhomenko, N.A. Shchors and other renowned commanders and heroes of the civil war.

Work on the series of books about the heroic past of our homeland is continuing. These are pocket-sized books comprised of five author's sheets. Here are the titles of some of them included in the work: "Yermak," "Shturm Korfu" [Assault Against Corfu], "Tamanskiy pokhod" [Taman Campaign], "Cherez Sivash" [Across the Sivash], "Pervyy voyennyy aerodrom" [First Military Airfield], "Baltiyskiy nad Berlinom" [Baltic Soldiers over Berlin] and "Podvig olshantsev" [Feat of the Olshantsy]. We suppose that the authors will write these books with publicistic fervor, brilliantly and interestingly.

Highly qualified collectives of authors are working on the fundamental many-volumed works "Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne. Dokumenty i materialy" [Soviet Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War. Documents and Materials] in five volumes and "Istoriya voyn i voyennogo iskusstva" [History of Wars and Military Science] in four volumes. In addition to these works, the staff members of the Institute of Military History are now busy putting together the work "Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily: istoricheskiy ocherk. 1918-1993 gg." [Soviet Armed Forces: Historical Outline 1918-1993]. It is planned to publish this jubilee issue consisting of 60 publisher's sheets for the 75th anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy.

The main task, of course, that the editor's office for military historical literature and the authors' collective are working to resolve is the publication of the fundamental work "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna sovetskogo naroda" [Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People] in 10 volumes.

The idea of writing a book on the contribution of the Soviet Armed Forces to the defense of peace is being examined. This must be an exciting story about the combat training and service of the soldiers of all branches of the armed forces. We have been living under the conditions of peace for 42 years. And the contribution of the soldiers of the army and navy to its provision is enormous. Our armed forces are a powerful factor in restraining imperialist aggressors.

A creative search is also under way in the editor's office for memorial literature. The next thing that will be realized from plans is the creation of a series of the most significant memoirs written by Soviet military commanders. In this series, it is planned to reissue the works

of important military leaders of Russia, renowned revolutionaries and participants in October, and companions in arms of V.I. Lenin. For example, the memoirs of V.A. Antonov-Ovseyenko on the revolution and civil war. Also being prepared for publication are the memoirs of MSU D.F. Ustinov "Vo imya pobedy" [In the Name of Victory] and marshals of aviation Ye.Ya. Savitskiy "Polveka s nebom" [A Half Century with the Sky], G.V. Zimin "Istrebiteli" [Fighters] and I.I. Pstygo "Na boyevom kurse" [In the Course of Combat]. The books of generals of the army S.P. Ivanov "Shtab armeyskiy, shtab frontovoy" [Army Staff, Front Staff] and N.G. Lyashchenko "Vremya vybral nas" [The Time Chose Us] will be issued. They are working on the memoirs of Adm of the Soviet Navy S.G. Gorshkov and Mar Avn A.P. Silantyev.

We hope that readers will be satisfied with the new series of books "Military Glory of the Fatherland." This series will include the letters, notes and memoirs of A.V. Suvorov, the letters of M.I. Kutuzov, and the memoirs of the participants in the defense of Sevastopol (1854-1855) and the naval battles of the Russian fleet.

Voyenizdat is publishing historical works and memoirs of foreign authors. At the present time, the memoirs of Pyn Dekhuaya are being printed. It is studying the question of the publication of W. Churchill's one volume "Second World War," the book of William Schirer "Rise and Fall of the Third Reich," and a collection of historical materials and documents telling about the evolution of the views of Field Marshal Paulus, which ultimately led him to the ranks of the antifascists.

The creative search aimed at a deeper and more comprehensive treatment of military historical themes by Voenizdat is continuing.

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9746

MSU Vasilyevskiy Article on Kursk Bulge
18120058 Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in
English No 12, Dec 87 pp 57-59

Article by MSU A. Vasilevsky: "The Kursk Bulge"

[Text] We are completing extracts from the reminiscences by Marshal Vasilevsky, renowned Soviet military leader, twice Hero of the Soviet Union (30 September 1885-5 December 1977).

The previous extract told about Soviet troops fighting Army Group Don commanded by Field Marshal Manstein. That group tried to break through to the encircle troops of Paulus but was destroyed.

The extract below tells about the Battle of Kursk in 1943.

The strategic pause during April-June 1943 was used by both sides for working out new strategic plans and preparing for summer campaigns. The thirst for revenge, the striving to restore the tottering prestige of the German fascist army no matter what it cost drove the nazis to embark on new adventures. Despite all the differences of opinion and arguments, the plans of the German command amounted to substantially weakening the assault force of the expected summer offensive of Soviet troops and then launching a victorious offensive in the east, snatching the strategic initiative out of the hands of the Soviet command and marking a new turn in the war.

The decision they adopted envisaged undertaking a big summer offensive operation against the Soviet grouping within the Kursk Bulge.

The assignments of the troops and the measures taken for their success in the new offensive operation, which was given the code name "Zitadelle" (Citadel), were set forth in Operative Order No 6. Hitler signed it on 15 April 1943. It had the following to say: "I have decided that as soon as weather conditions permit I shall launch the Citadel offensive—the first offensive this year. This offensive must be given top priority. It must be done quickly and be completely successful. The offensive must give us the initiative for the spring and summer of this year..."

The reliance on mass employment of new types of equipment was one of the characteristic features of Hitler's "Operation Citadel" plan. The most efficient formations were involved in its implementation—50 select divisions, including 16 tank and motorised divisions. The number of nazi groupings reached approximately 900,000 men, 10,000 guns and mortars and 2,700 tanks and over 2,000 planes.

The GHQ also was doing everything possible for the summer campaign.

On 12 April, a meeting took place in the GHQ which Stalin attended, as did Zhukov arriving from the Voronezh Front, myself and Antonov (Deputy Chief of the General Staff—Ed.). We adopted an interim decision on a premeditated defence. Stalin was worried—and he made no attempts to hide his concern—at whether our troops could withstand an attack by a great mass of enemy tanks. But this was no longer 1941. The Red Army had been tempered in many battles, had acquired an enormous amount of fighting experience, possessed excellent equipment and first-class armour. Now fascists were afraid of us. So all wavering was brushed aside. A careful analysis of the situation and a forecast of how events would develop enabled us to make the right conclusion: we had to focus the major efforts to the north and south of Kursk, wear down the enemy there in a defensive battle, and then launch a counter-offensive and rout the enemy. After that we intended launching a general offensive of the Red Army, making the principal attack in the direction of Kharkov, Poltava and Kiev.

Incidentally, the meeting also examined another course of action: transfer of Soviet troops to active operation in the event of the nazi command calling off its immediate offensive around Kursk and postponing it for a protracted length of time.

After this meeting there began a comprehensive and careful preparation for the coming actions.

The whole range of large-scale measures were taken by the GHQ, the General Staff and front and army commands to create a deeply echeloned defence system. By the end of June a strong grouping of troops of the Voronezh and Central Fronts had been deployed at well-prepared lines of defence as a result of all the measures we had taken. This grouping comprised over 1,300,000 men, some 20,000 guns and mortars, over 3,300 tanks and 2,650 aircraft. Behind them was the Steppe Front ready both for defence and attack with almost 580,000 men, more than 9,000 gun mounts and mortars, 1,640 tanks and self-propelled guns. Both warring parties were in place awaiting the great events to come.

On the night of 2 July the information received at the General Staff from our intelligence section told us that in the next few days, at any rate no later than 6 July, the enemy's offensive on the Kursk sector was bound to begin. I instantly reported this to Stalin and asked permission to warn the fronts at once.

All was quiet on the Voronezh and the Central Fronts on 3 July, as it had been on all preceding days. But at 16.00 on 4 July the enemy carried out his reconnaissance in front on a wide sector of the Voronezh Front with approximately four battalions supported by 20 tanks, artillery and aircraft. All attempts by the enemy to drive a wedge into our forward line were repulsed. A prisoner captured during the battle, let us know that the soldiers had been issued with battle rations and a portion of schnapps, and that they were to launch an offensive on 5 July. From a telephone conversation with Zhukov I found out that this was confirmed by enemy deserters who had come over to us on the Central Front on July 4. After consulting with Vatutin we decided in the night of 5 July to carry out the planned artillery and air counter-barrage which, as we found out later, produced just the desired effect. The enemy, being poised for the offensive, suffered great losses in men and equipment. We also caused havoc with the enemy's artillery fire system and disrupted troop control. Enemy aircraft also suffered casualties on their airfields and they lost contact with their field command. Many nazi commanders took this strong counter-barrage as the beginning of our offensive. Even without knowing the detailed results of our counter-measures we felt a sense of enormous satisfaction with its overall consequences. The nazis had a great deal of trouble getting their offensive started three hours later than the 03.00 on 5 July.

Thus began the great battle on the Kursk Bulge. Both enemy groupings went on to the offensive that same day against Kursk simultaneously from the north and the south. Soviet troops engaged in a fierce battle with the enemy.

The defensive operation of the Voronezh and Central Fronts continued from 5 to 23 July. After 12 July, the 5th Guards Tank and the 5th Field Armies of the Steppe Front which had been transferred to the Voronezh Front joined the fighting.

All in all the enemy offensive lasted less than a week and by 12 July had ended in failure. As a result of the unprecedented resistance by Soviet troops, the enemy, having borne tremendous casualties and advanced only 12 km in the northern face of the Kursk Bulge and up to 35 km in the southern face, was forced to stop his offensive and withdraw his troops. The fascists had not succeeded in surrounding Soviet troops as they had planned in the Citadel Operation. Soviet defences had been too strong for them. We then had every opportunity for launching our planned counter-offensive. The principal result of the defensive battle ought to be seen, in my view, as the defeat of the enemy tank formations by which we gained the upper hand in this important area. To a large extent this was aided by victory in the large tank encounter to the south of Prokhorovka 30 km from Belgorod. I happened to be a witness to this truly titanic duel between the two steel armadas (up to 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns) which took place on the southern face of the Kursk Bulge on 12 July.

The second stage of the Kursk Battle began on 12 July and lasted until 23 August. The Bryansk and Western Fronts under Colonel-Generals Popov and Sokolovsky first went into attack against the Oryol enemy grouping. On 15 July the Central Front under General of the Army Rokossovsky launched a counter-offensive. As a result of the joint operation of the three front which had the above-mentioned code name "Kutuzov" the enemy's Oryol bridgehead was wiped out by 18 August and the fascists operating there were routed.

The counter-offensive in the Belgorod-Kharkov direction commenced on 3 August. It was launched jointly by the forces of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts in concert with the South-Western Front within the framework of the "Rumyantsev" operation. In connection with the successful development of the offensive in the Kharkov direction, the GHQ issued a directive on 6 August ordering the South-Western Front to launch its main effort in the south, jointly with the Southern Front to destroy the enemy's Donbas grouping and to take Gorlovka and Stalino (Donetsk). The chief mission of the Southern Front was to direct its main effort at Stalino and there join up with the shock force of the South-Western Front. It ended with the complete rout of the enemy and the liberation of Kharkov.

We were unable then to analyze thoroughly the results of the Battle of the Kursk Bulge. Yet one thing was clear: we had not only won a great battle, we had matured in it. Our propositions in working out the plan of a summer campaign had been justified; we had learned how to assess the enemy's intentions. We had had enough will-power, character, sheer stamina and nerve to avoid a miscalculation, a premature battle engagement or presenting the enemy with a chance to retrieve the situation. Elaboration of the operational and strategic assignments had been done successfully. Troop control had grown in skill at all levels. In a word, our leadership had displayed both a creative skill and a superiority over the military skill of the Nazi command.

As a result of the Kursk Battle, the Soviet Armed Forces had dealt the enemy a buffeting from which Nazi Germany was never to recover. It lost 30 of its divisions, including 7 Panzer divisions. Losses of German land forces amounted to over 500,000 men, 1,500 tanks, 3,000 guns and over 3,500 warplanes. These losses and the failure of the offensive which had been so widely acclaimed in Nazi propaganda forced the Germans finally to go over to a strategic defence along the entire Soviet-German front. The big defeat at the Kursk Bulge was the beginning of a fatal crisis for the German army.

Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk became three important stages in the fight against the enemy, three historic landmarks on the way to victory over fascist Germany. The initiative on the Soviet-German front—the major and decisive front of the entire war—had firmly passed to the Red Army. Subsequent operations took place in circumstances of our undivided possession of that initiative, and this was an important factor in achieving new great military victories over the enemy.

Thus, the almost two-month Kursk Battle ended in the convincing triumph of the Soviet Armed Forces, and its results acquired unparalleled international significance. It became apparent that Nazi Germany was heading for catastrophe against the might of Soviet weaponry and the selfless fighting of the Soviet people. The Kursk victory extended and motivated even more the front of the national liberation struggle by peoples enslaved by fascism. It bolstered public sympathies across the world for the first country of socialism, which was bringing them liberation from the Black Plague of fascism.

Footnote

I. A. Vasilevsky. "A Lifelong Cause". Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1984. For beginning, see SMR Nos 7-10, 1987 (Abridged).

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Discussion of Planned U.S. Aegis DDG

18010088c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
6 Jan 88 p 3

[Article, published under the heading "Military Technical Review," by Capt 3d Rank V. Proskurin: "Destroyers: The Aegis System." Words in italics as published]

[Text] As has been announced by the journal *Design News*, the United States intends to build a new destroyer equipped with a complex automated control system, Aegis. The cost of the ship has been estimated at a billion dollars and the design is to be complete by 1990. What stands behind these figures? Why by 1994 do they plan to have in the fleet three-score such ships?

In answering these questions, foreign observers have directed attention to the fact that the new destroyer will have powerful weapons, increased survivability and the capacity to carry out various operations, including the combating of surface ships, covering carrier task forces, landing operations and rear support. In other words, the military specialists have pointed out, the new destroyers with the Aegis System will surpass the current missile-carrying destroyers and thereby "pay back the costs."

The advertising spares no effort in describing the Aegis System, emphasizing that it has been developed for combating ships, aircraft and submarines, guided missiles and torpedoes. The computer of this system, in the information supplied by *Design News*, provides recognition of the targets and their type, it calculates the target speed with simultaneous continuous tracking. The system is capable of automatically choosing the onboard weapons and controlling them.

It has been pointed out that the multifunction radar with a phased antenna array with electronic scanning of the directional pattern will provide detection and tracking of targets at a range of over 370 km. It will also be marked by increased resistance to jamming and a special computer will provide automatic control of the emitted transmitter power.

The MK-99 fire control system of the new ship in addition will include three target illuminating radars for the combat employment of guided missiles with semiautomatic radar guidance. For combating an air enemy, they propose employing vertical launchers for the SM-2 missiles. The destroyer will also be armed with cluster launchers with Harpoon guided missiles, two rapid-fire automatic cannons with a circular arc of fire and one 127-mm cannon.

They plan to include in the ASW weapons both active and passive systems, including ASW vertical-launch missiles and torpedoes and on the aft deck they plan a helicopter pad.

The total power of the four ship engines is 100,000 hp and this makes it possible to develop a speed of over 30 knots.

Design News has also given other specifications of the ship. The hull width of the destroyer on the levels of the deck and the vertical is, correspondingly, 20 and 18 m, and the length of the hull and the vertical is 155 and 142 m, the displacement tonnage is 8,300 tons and the number of crew members is 340 men. The new shape of the hull, the observers have pointed out, reduces the heaving and increases speed in heavy waves.

In announcing all these data, the foreign press has given the following fact: due to the use of computerized designing and the employment of modular elements, the designing time of the fighting ship has been shortened from 50 to 30 months. Time will tell whether they are able to shorten the proposed delivery dates.

10272

Pentagon Said To Seek Japanese Aid for New Conventional Weapons

18010074a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Dec 87 p 3

[Article by V. Vinogradov: "They Entrap..."]

[Text] The creation of military robots and the latest models of weapons, and the development of ultra-fast computers for automated systems to control combat operations — such proposals have recently been directed to the Japanese corporations from Pentagon offices, which are attempting to drag Tokyo into the next large-scale militaristic program. According to the newspaper (IOMIURI), already in January of next year Washington counts on obtaining an agreement from Japanese Prime Minister N. Takeshita when he arrives in the U. S. on an official visit to participate in the so-called "Balanced Technological Initiative" (STI). Under this cloudy name, states the newspaper, is concealed a comprehensive plan for creating fundamentally new types of non-nuclear weapons of increased accuracy and destructive force. With their assistance, emphasizes (IOMIURI), the Pentagon hopes to patch up the "gaps" that in its opinion implementation of the treaty between the USSR and U. S. on the elimination of intermediate and shorter range missiles will create.

Washington plans to involve its main allies in this new "initiative," distributing among them the financial burden for cranking up the latest spiral in the arms race. One of the primary roles is allocated to Japan. The authors of this program intend to use the scientific and technological capability of the Land of the Rising Sun, first of all to create RPVs [remotely powered vehicles] capable of operating independently at low altitudes, for example against tanks. The list of potential orders of the American side also includes radar stations to guide short range missiles and torpedoes, and miniature computers for

comprehensive battlefield control. It should be noted that Japanese specialists have already been involved in creating a robot tank in the U. S., which is to independently find and destroy targets. According to Kyodo news service, a group of Pentagon experts is coming to Japan to become familiar with the most promising developments of local companies.

As is known, already in July of this year the Japanese Government signed an agreement with Washington about the conditions for Japanese participation in the American "Star Wars" program. A few days ago the U. S. administration proposed that the Japanese Government and private companies in this country take part in research on creating a "Japanese variant" of SDI. In the words of the newspaper (NIKON KEIDZAI), Washington views this project as an integral part of SDI, and in order to entice Tokyo states that it will serve the goals of "the defense of Japan." The "Japanese variant" provides for extensive involvement of Tokyo in development of the latest military technology and participation of Japan in plans for the militarization of space. Six Japanese companies, in particular Mitsubishi, (Hitati), and (Fujitsu), are already planning to undertake joint steps to obtain the corresponding orders from the U. S. in the new year.

So Washington, using various channels, will strive to involve Japan, having in mind especially her scientific and technological capability, in its militaristic programs. And, judging by everything, there are those on the Japanese islands who, for the sake of possible profits, are not against allowing the country to be dragged into a costly arms race, including in space, and one which, most importantly, is fraught with serious consequences. Moreover, in the plan for conventional arms, Japan doesn't look all that bad in Washington's opinion. Senator Rockefeller reported with satisfaction during a speech in the U. S. Congress that by 1990 Tokyo will move up from its current sixth place to fourth in terms of the level of its expenditures, overtaking Britain and France in this index. The growth rates of Japanese military expenditures serve as a guarantee of this, the senator believes. In the last five years they have comprised 5.6 percent, which is more than three times that of the similar NATO index. Rockefeller also cited other figures that indicated the growing might of the Japanese "Self Defense Forces." Thus, in terms of the size of her Air Force, they have exceeded all of the U. S. Air Force deployed in Asia, and the size of the Japanese naval forces is almost half that of the U. S. 7th Fleet.

The newspaper (MAINITI), which published this data, states that Japan "is already a major military power." But, this is not enough for Washington and Tokyo. They display interest in further increasing the military might of the Land of the Rising Sun.

Japanese GLCM Launcher

18010074b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Dec 87 p 3

[Unsigned Article: "From Shore... Against Ships"]

[Text] According to a report by the weekly AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Japan has completed the development and testing of a ground self-propelled system intended to use SSM-1 cruise missiles to destroy enemy ships. The missiles are launched from a six-container launcher, created on the chassis of a three-axle high mobility truck.

The SSM-1 missile has a solid-fuel booster that accelerates it to near supersonic speed; a turbo-jet sustainer engine and combination (inertial and active radar) self-guided warhead. Its maximum flight range is 150 km.

The Japanese Ministry of Defense plans to purchase the first six SSM-1 missile launch platforms in fiscal year 1988. In the next five years it intends to acquire 54 launch platforms and to form three missile battalions on Hokkaido Island.

It is anticipated that a ship-to-ship missile (range 120 km) will be created based on the SSM-1 missile, to replace the American Harpoon Anti-Ship Missiles.

9069

TTC's on New 'Walrus' Class Dutch Submarine Noted

18010307 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Jan 88 p 3

[Unattributed article entitled: "For the Dutch Navy"].

[Text] As the journal "Armada International" reported, a second diesel-electric submarine of the "Walrus" class, named the "Zeelev" has been launched in the Netherlands. It has a displacement of 2800 tons, surface [displacement] of 2450 tons; length of 68, width of 8.5, draught of 6.6 m; greatest speed of movement submerged/surfaced — 20/13 knots, diving range — more than 300 m, armaments — 20 American dual-purpose Mk48 torpedoes and Harpoon anti-ship missiles, fired from four 533-mm torpedo tubes; crew of 49.

Following fitting out at the naval wharf in Rotterdam, alongside and sea-trials, the submarine "Zeelev" should join the fleet in 1989. In total to 1993 the Dutch Navy plans to procure 4 "Walrus" class submarines to replace "Dolphin" class vessels (submerged displacement of 1,830 tons, crew of 67). In comparison with them ("Dolphin" class) the new boats, according to the evaluation of foreign specialists, are quieter, have much improved armament and command and control systems for the weapons and the ship. A high level of automation has made it possible to reduce the number of the crew.

First Test of 'Alpha' Laser Noted

[Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian published in Russian on 6 January 1988 on page 1 a 400-word article by PRAVDA's U.S. Correspondent in New York, V. Linnik, entitled: "Correspondent Comments: Concerning 'Alpha' and Trust". The article notes that the U.S. Air Force conducted the first of four intended tests of the SDI-related 'Alpha' chemical laser in California. The laser is asserted to have a power of 2 million watts at present, and may easily be increased to 5-10 million watts. It is said to be capable of destroying any current or planned missile. However, American academicians opposed to "Star Wars" are said to believe that the system is too low-powered to successfully carry out any mission. Therefore, it's only purpose is to disrupt the ABM treaty.

Review: Zhilin (ed.)—NATO States and Military Conflicts

18010321 [Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian of 2 February 1988 published a 350-word article by Colonel B. Molostov, Candidate of Philosophical Sciences, entitled: "Notes about books: The Sources of Military Conflicts."

The article reviews a 311-page military-historical volume edited by P.A. Zhilin, R. Bryula (GDR), and K. Sobachka (PPR) and published by Nauka publishers in 1987 and titled: "The NATO States and Military

Conflicts". It points out that the NATO states have participated in nearly all recent military conflicts. "During its existence it [NATO] has unleashed more than 150 armed conflicts, more than once leading humanity to the brink of world catastrophe." The U.S. is said to have used its armed forces more than 260 times to achieve its foreign political goals between 1945 and 1983. More than 30 the U.S. was said to have threatened the use of nuclear weapons.

"The authors analyze from a precise Marxist-Leninist point of view the essence and content of military conflicts in the modern era, their place and role in the political strategy of imperialism, and their close interrelationship with military-bloc policy. ..."

"In the course of conflicts NATO's strategic leadership tests new weapons, forces' organization and means of combat operations. The analysis of the influence of the experience of aggressive wars and conflicts upon the process of the organizational development of the armed forces of the NATO states, the development of military theory and the formation of doctrine and concepts will interest the military reader."

The volume also discusses Western falsifications concerning the "Soviet military threat". And "convincingly demonstrates" that conflicts said to have been initiated by the U.S. and/or NATO have intensified the danger of war.

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